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CONTEMPT FOR WORKERS,
BY H.J. GLASBEEK*
Charter proponents have been hopeful that the courts will use the
constitutional entrenchment of rights to enlarge the political freedom of
Canadians. Charter opponents have been doubtful of the court's ability
to do so and, more importantly, of their willingness to do so where the
enhancement of rights would undermine existing power relations. While
many cases which come before the courts do not raise this issue squarely,
the contradictory propositions are tested where capital labour conflicts
are the subject of litigation. The argument is that it is the courts' historic
mission to safeguard capital from working class challenges. Two recent
contempt of court cases are used to demonstrate the judiciary's continued
protection of private property and contract rights at the expense of the
working classes political ambitions.
I. OUR BELIEF THAT WE ARE FREE
When does an ideal become a barrier to the realization of what it supposedly
promotes? When people are encouraged to treat the ideal as a description, however
imperfect, of the real, as in the claim that ours is a society ruled by law, where
whatever actually exists that goes counter to this claim is relegated to the role of a
passing qualification. Viewed in this way, the dynamics of who is doing what to
whom and why, together with the structural reforms needed to change things, can
never be understood.1
In public discussions about the comparative merits of living
capitalism and socialism - especially in the last decade, during which
time it has become increasingly problematic as to whether the
advanced capitalist nations will be capable of sustaining economic
well-being for the mass of their citizenry - liberal democrats are likely
to point to the fact that, in a country such as Canada, all citizens
o
Copyright, 1990, HJ. Glasbeek. No part of this paper may be published or reprinted
without express written permission of the author. A preliminary version of this paper was
presented at a faculty seminar at the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa on the 9 March
1989.
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 B. Oilman, 'Toward a Marxist Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution" (1987) 39(7)
Monthly Review 18 at 24.
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have the fundamental right to adhere to their beliefs and convictions
and to speak about them freely. It is this, it is argued, which makes
our system superior; it is this which makes a country like Canada
democratic. Further, these advocates are likely to claim, it is the lack
of equivalent rights in centrally planned, would-be socialist countries
such as the USSR or Cuba which makes them undemocratic.2
The recent reinstatement of Polish Solidarity as a lawful
organization serves as a reminder of the events which had led to its
demise. The attitude we displayed towards Polish Solidarity in 1980
provides a good illustration of our certainty that we have democracy
and states like Poland do not. At that time there was an outpouring
of sympathy and support for the oppressed Polish workers, and of
outrage at the repression with which they were meeting when they
made their demands. This attitude was, on its face, not easy to
comprehend. After all, Polish workers involved in Solidarity were
engaged in a general strike. We, in Canada, have never permitted
that to take place. Such uprisings, or even attempts at them, have
been met with forceful and direct repression, from the 1919
Winnipeg General Strike, to the Quebec public sector strike in 1972,
to the pathetic One Day of Protest mounted by the Canadian Labour
Congress in 1976, to the threats posed by Operation Solidarity in
British Columbia in 1983.3 Yet when Polish Solidarity was outlawed
2 The welcoming of Perestroika and Glasnost by our media seems to be premised on the
basis that, finally, the USSR will be more like us and, therefore, will be a better nation
because it will accord individuals the kinds of civil liberties which our citizens already enjoy.
3 For a good account of the vigour with which the Winnipeg General Strike was put
down, see D. Bercusson, "The Winnipeg General Strike" in I.M. Abella, ed., On Strike; Six Key
Labour Struggles in Canada 1919-1949 (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1975) c. 1. The 1972 Common
Front strike in Quebec is described in D. Ethier, J.-M. Piotte & 3. Reynolds, Les travailleurs
contre l'etat bourgeois (Montreal: L'Aurore, 1975); see also Black Rose Books Editorial
Collective eds, Quebec Labour: The Confederation of National Trade Unions Yesterday and
Today (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1975). That strike, in addition to the concerted
cessation of work it involved, replicated some of the other Polish workers' tactics, including
the capture of a radio station to broadcast news. The workers were forced back to work add
union leaders who refused to co-operate were jailed, just like their Polish equivalents. For an
indication that the political change the Quebec labour movement was seeking was of the same
sweeping kind as that which the Polish Solidarity movement sought, see its manifesto "Ne
Comptons Que Sur Nos Propres Moyens, 1971" reproduced in Quebec Labour, cited above.
The One Day of Protest was called that because the calling of a general strike of workers by
their leaders against the repressive income restraint legislation of the time would clearly have
been illegal and would have been considered to be a long way beyond the political pale. It
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and workers were restricted to bargaining with their particular
employer (as are ours), to have their strikes regulated by legal
overseers, including the total denial of the right to strike for some
workers (as is the case here), there was an audible sigh of
disapproving regret throughout our nation.
The widespread sympathy for Polish Solidarity in Canada can
be explained only on the basis that we understood that that
movement was a political movement, a way for the mass of Polish
workers to attain democratic rights. Their general union was
perceived to be the means whereby workers were trying to assert
themselves politically, even though they were using what we, in
Canada, characterize as the unacceptable use of collective power.
We feel justified in not permitting our workers to use their economic
power for political purposes because we believe that workers, qua
citizens, have adequate participatory political rights. They can vote,
form political parties of their choice, and raise funds to pursue their
beliefs and convictions. Unlike in Poland, then, it is legitimate to
separate the political sphere from the economic sphere in Canada.
This reasoning is justified on the basis that we, in Canada, do have a
great measure of individual political freedom. In this paper, I will
look at that assumption from the perspective of how much scope our
law, enriched as it is by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,4 gives to
workers who want to act and to speak politically.
would have been imprudent for unionists to call a spade a spade, a general strike a general
strike. Despite this caution by the labour movement, the law exacted its price; for an
elaboration, see H. Glasbeek, "Labour Relations' Policy and Law as Mechanisms of
Adjustment" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 179. For a good discussion of how British
Columbia's Operation Solidarity nearly became a general strike and how political and legal
pressures were combined to defeat this, see B. Palmer, "The Rise and Fall of British
Columbia's Solidarity ' in B. Palmer, ed., The Character of Class Struggle: Essays in Canadian
Working Class History, 1850-1985 (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1986). For a recent
indication of how intolerant many of us in Canada are to the use of concerted economic
activity by workers who want to influence the political process, note the Attorney-General of
British Columbia's (failed) attempt to obtain a blanket injunction to restrain future labour
protests against the Social Credit government; see "A-G's sledgehammer is a thing abhorrent
to the law of the land" The Vancouver Sun (4 June 1987) B4.
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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II. OUR FREEDOM ENHANCED - THE CHARTER AND THE
JUDICIARY AS LIBERATORS
In 1980, the time of Polish Solidarity's formation and uprising,
Canada did not have the benefit of the Charter. We did believe,
however, that we had freely exercisable rights of speech, assembly,
and association, as well as real choices in respect of political and
religious beliefs, freedom from arbitrary incarceration, and so forth.
If we had any doubt about our political freedoms, it was as to the
scope of those freedoms. They were not unlimited in range and
could always be denied or constrained by legislative and/or executive
action. Moreover, there was always the problem, endemic to a
private property-based polity, that it is one thing to have the right to
act freely but quite another to have the means to do so. For
instance, in respect of the right to free speech, even if left alone by
governmental actors, individuals still have, to find a place in which to
exercise their right. One commentator has argued that the grave lack
of public space in which to exercise the right of free speech in the
U.S.A. has led to a lack of a public sphere, that is, to the absence of
a positive environment which encourages people to develop their
political rights.S Whatever the merits of that argument, the
conventional wisdom before the enshrinement of the Charter was that
the political rights of Canadians were more liberal in scope, both in
theory and in practice, than the analogous rights in a planned society
such as Poland. This conviction has grown stronger with the
entrenchment of these political rights in our constitution. We now
have a way of making sure that they will not be undermined by
frivolous, capricious, or malevolent actions of an executive or
legislature. An independent, impartial judiciary will safeguard our
political freedom. The Charter gives credence to our claim to be a
free and democratic society, one in which the use of economic power
to assert political rights is unnecessary.
B.R. Barber, Strong Democracy; Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984); see also H. Glasbeek, "Entrenchment of Freedom of
Speech for the Press - Fettering of Freedom of Speech of the People" in P. Anisman & A.M.
Linden eds, The Media, the Courts and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 101.
[VOL. 28 NO. 1
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This line of reasoning is posited on certain assumptions.
First, there has to be a belief that judges have the tools and the
ability to meet the demands which will be made upon them in giving
meaning and life to the rights and freedoms enshrined in the
constitution, the scope of which is, after all, contentious. The
methodology of common law adjudication is the major tool; it
purports to rely on established decisions which are to be manipulated
and moulded in a constrained manner, leading to the development of
a coherent jurisprudence which renders the law certain, predictable,
and easily applicable. The use of this methodology requires great
skill. Proponents of the constitutional entrenchment of rights assume
that judges have always had these skills and will continue to exhibit
them or, alternatively, that they will develop them as they respond to
the great and new responsibilities imposed on them. In addition,
underlying the reasoning of the protagonists of the Charter is the
assumption that judges will have the vision to interpret the rights and
freedoms enshrined in the constitution in such a way as to achieve (i)
the lofty aims denoted by constitutionalizing them, and (ii) the
perfection of democracy. It is hoped that, somehow, judges will be
informed that this is their role and that they will understand that they
are to fulfill it by reflecting the fundamental consensus which is the
essence of the Canadian polity. The perception is that judges will be
helped to do all these things by the fact that they are above the fray.
They are not prone to be influenced by electoral and interest-politics,
political factors which all too often obscure the view of other policy-
makers and politicians.
III. DOUBTS ABOUT THE FREEDOM-ENHANCING
POSSIBILITIES OF A JUDICIARY ARMED WITH THE
CHARTER
Many people think that these assumptions about the
judiciary's ability and vision are ill-founded. They argue that the
adjudicative methodology is necessarily incoherent because it is always
political in nature. That is, these critics believe that judges have
predilections and biases which inform their decisions more than do
the dictates of a scheme of internal logic imbued with the spirit of a
politically independent profession's mores and that, all too often,
1990]
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these preferences (often unconsciously held) favour the status quo.
And, if this is true, the argument goes, judges should not be
entrusted with such important political decisions as the Charter
mandates them to make, precisely because they are not accountable
to the people in any substantive way. They are not as accountable as
our elected politicians are, or even as accountable as our responsible
public servants are. This lack of accountability is made all the worse,
these critics argue, because judges come from the elite of our society,
from the most conservative segments of the population, giving those
segments an undue advantage in disputations arising over what are,
by definition, fundamental rights. Some critics go further, contending
that it is the very nature of law itself, and of the Charter in particular,
which prevents the judiciary, no matter what its stripe, from
undermining the essential elements of the status quo which
disadvantages so many Canadians.
IV. THE ACID TEST FOR THE JUDICIARY'S POTENTIAL,
EVEN WHEN ARMED WITH THE CHARTER, TO ACT AS A
LIBERATOR: CAPITAL-LABOUR CONFLICTS
Many of the cases which arise for decision by courts under
the Charter do not answer the question as to which of these two
divergent views is the more persuasive one. This is so because many
of the decisions rendered by the courts can be justified on the basis
that they have been made by judges who are according internally
generated professional principles their proper respect. That is, judges
can decide a great number of cases by reference to criteria which do
not require choosing between sharply clashing policies. The reason
for this is that these cases do not bring into focus the deep divisions
in our society. For example, when courts deal with legal rights (those
found in sections 8 to 13 of the Charter) - which they do more often
than they deal with any of the other provisions found in the Charter6
- they are interpreting rules of their own making which occasionally
have been tampered with by the legislatures or, more often, by law
6 B.L. Strayer, "Life Under the Canadian Charter. Adjusting the Balance Between
Legislatures and Courts" [1988] Public Law 347 at 356 cites empirical studies which indicate
that some 90 percent of Charter cases have involved the legal rights' provisions.
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enforcement agencies or officers. These cases are characterized as
raising procedural, sometimes very important procedural, issues.
There is a large measure of consensus on how to deal with these
issues. Hence, there is no need for the courts to take a principled,
potentially controversial, stand on fundamental values, one which
might be seen as extremely harmful by significant groups in society.
But, the courts do purport to take principled stances in these cases.
A perceptual mirage has been created as in many of the decisions
dealing with legal rights the judicial rhetoric is replete with references
to the sacred nature of Canadians' freedom and liberty, suggesting
that vital concerns of our polity are being dealt with by the courts.
The courts are holding out that they are dealing, and more
importantly, are capable of dealing, with serious political issues. But,
while the lives of particular individuals are affected by the decisions
in these cases, the impact of these decisions on political freedoms and
participatory rights in our society is marginal.7 Yet, even in this
politically non-controversial setting there is room for the argument
that class biases colour judicial decision-making, throwing doubt on
the proposition that courts decide cases on the basis of neutrally-
derived principles they find in the Charter and which they apply to all
Canadians in an evenhanded way. Thus, in Hunter v. Southam,8 the
Supreme Court of Canada decided, without discussion, that a
corporation should be entitled to the same kind of protection which
is to be given to a human being to safeguard the essence of her or
his self, namely, a constitutional right to privacy. While the actual
holding was, in practice, just an example of procedural rule-making
which hardly affected anything of significance in the justice system
(causing some sympathetic Charter analysts to defend it in precisely
7Strayer, ibid. argues that in these kinds of cases the legislatures and the executive tend
to agree with the courts' approach. They have no conscious desire or intent to coerce
Canadians suspected or accused of criminal behaviour, or to deal with those who are subject
to the decisions and policies of administrative agencies in an inappropriate manner. Rather,
the denial of proper process by governments, their agents and functionaries for which redress
is sought by reference to the Charter is, more often than not, the result of neglect and failure
to oversee zealous prosecutors and bureaucrats. Thus, Strayer writes that "with respect to
many of the provisions which have been struck down in this area, Charter rights were being
denied not through a contemporary and meaningful will of legislatures but through legislative
indifference.... Provisions of this nature rarely attract the interest of legislators." Ibid. at 358.
8 Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [hereinafter Southam].
1990]
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this way),9 the unthinking attribution of feelings uniquely possessed
by human beings to that ultimate manifestation of capitalism, a
corporation, stuck in the gorge of those who see the judiciary as an
agent of the ruling class.
To return: many of the Charter cases which come before the
courts, then, support another of the Charter proponents' assumptions
which is very important to them, but one which they seldom articulate
with any sophistication. This is that our society is based on
consensus, one which is not plagued by irreconcilable conflicts. But,
this is not so: this is a class-divided society, one in which the conflict
between capital and labour persists, even though many mediating
structures tend to hide this truth from plain view. The conflict arises
from the fact that a very few people, employers, own the bulk of the
resources, whereas the many, workers, only own their labour power.
10
In the past, courts have sided with capital when it clashed with
labour. This well-established fact is central to the argument of those
who oppose the Charter as an instrument to achieve a better society.
They reason that both the bias of the judiciary and the nature of the
law they have fashioned over time in a class-based society demand
that courts should be given less power to resolve capital-labour
clashes, rather than more. The power of this line of argument is well
recognized. One not unsympathetic Charter commentator has
written: "It is also true that organized labour has not fared well in
P.H. Russell, "Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Political Report" [1988]
Public Law 385 at 387 noted:
[This decision has no real effect on government's capacity to enforce the existing
law, nor on its willingness to introduce tougher anti-combines legislation. I would
add that a ruling making it more difficult for officers of government to research the
files of a newspaper is very much in the interests of the left, right and the middle
in a liberal democracy."
Note that characterizing the holding as giving protection to a "newspaper," a repository of
democratic participatory rights, sounds much better than arguing that protection was given to
a profit-grabbing "corporation." Unfortunately for this clever ploy, the Supreme Court of
Canada, unlike Professor Russell, did not stress the fact that it was a newspaper, rather than
a corporation, which was being safeguarded.
10 L. Osberg, Economic Inequality in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) has shown
that the richest 10 percent of Canadians own 57 percent of Canada's total personal assets,
while the bottom 40 percent own 1 percent of those assets.
[VCOL. 28 NO. 1
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Charterland."11 He goes on to refer to the right to strike cases
(which are discussed below), and to Edwards Books and Arts Ltd v.
The Queen,12 which he seems to see as a pro-labour decision. He
continues:
As a political science court-watcher, I have the impression that many members of
the judiciary - above all those who serve on the Supreme Court of Canada - are
sensitive to the left's concerns and are struggling to avoid an approach to the
Charter which will give credence to them.
1 3
That is, it is when there is a dispute before the courts
between workers who seek to use their collective power against
capital's interests that we will be able to confront, most directly, such
questions as:
(1) What side are the courts on?
(2) Will they be able to overcome their ancient biases against labour
collectivities and thereby fulfill what Charter proponents see as
the judiciary's mission, the enhancement of freedom of individuals
and the perfection of democracy?
(3) Or, at the very least, can we expect this much from the more
progressive judges who grace our benches and are sympathetic to
the visions supposedly embedded in the Charter, leading them to
give workers a respect not accorded them by courts in an earlier
epoch when there was no clear enunciation of the significance of
the political rights of all Canadian citizens, no matter in what
circumstance they wanted to exercise them?
11 Russell, supra, note 9 at 387.
12 (1986), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
13 Russell, supra, note 9 at 387-88.
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
V. RATIONALIZATION OF APPARENT SET-BACKS TO
THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT THE JUDICIARY ARMED WITH
THE CHARTER ENHANCES CANADIANS' FREEDOMS
The answers to some of these questions began to emerge with
the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in two sets of cases dealing
with the collective rights of labour: the right to strike cases14 and
Dolphin Delivery.
15
In the right to strike cases, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the freedom to associate, enshrined in the Charter, means
just that: it permits people to associate with whomever they like, no
more, no less. It does not give workers who decide to associate
together for the purpose of winning better working and social
conditions an inviolable right to use any power their association might
afford them to such ends. Indeed, if it is likely that the power
derived from such an association might yield them gains unacceptable
to the legislature, the judiciary is to hold that the legislature can
forbid the members of the association from withholding their labour
in concert, that is, from using the only tool which gives them power,
even-though it is well understood that the potential of the use of this
power was the principal reason why these people decided to associate
with each other in the first place. Despite the Charter and its specific
guarantee of the freedom of association, then, the right to strike in
Canada, as in Poland, can only exist insofar as the state, in its
legislative guise, is willing to permit it to exist. It is not for the
courts to fashion new rights on the basis of the Charter. It is to be
noted that the strike activity constrained by legislation in each of the
right to strike cases was aimed at particular employers, not at the
state as a whole. That is, the judicially upheld statutory fetters were
not ones prohibiting dangerous general strikes of the kind which the
government in Poland was lambasted for repressing.
14 Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (1987), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; Public Service
Alliance of Canada v. Attorney General of Manitoba (1987), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; Retail,
Wholesale and Department Store Union, Locals 544, 496, 635 and 955 v. Government of
Saskatchewan (1987), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
15 Retail Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd
(1986), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
[VOL. 28 NO. 1
Contempt for Workers
In Dolphin, the Supreme Court of Canada was confronted
with another kind of issue. Workers who seek to make gains by
means of a permitted strike have two major recurring difficulties to
overcome. One is the fact that, in a capitalistic society, there are
many people who need to work and who might be able to replace
them, making a strike ineffective. The second is that some
employers' businesses are integrated with that of others, or may be
sympathetically supported by other businesses when they are struck.
Thus, a strike may be less painful to the primary target of the strike
than it otherwise might be because that employer knows that
production can be continued, or that contracts will be honoured
somehow, and/or that its existing share of the market is not seriously
threatened. Workers on strike, therefore, ask would-be replacement
workers not to do struck work; they ask the same of workers
employed by businesses who do business with, or on behalf of, the
struck employer during the strike, and/or ask would-be customers,
purchasers, and suppliers of the struck employer not to continue to
do business with it during the strike. These tactics are calculated to
make the cessation of production, which the striking workers are
attempting to bring about, bite. They are the natural concomitant of
a strike. In practice, workers implement these strategies by
publicizing the strike and the reasons for it. Leaflets are published,
speeches are made, and strikers parade outside target employers'
premises, and those of associated businesses, with placards, asking for
support. They often get angry when people ignore their requests,
particularly if replacement workers are brought in. Their jobs and
livelihoods are on the line. Violence may break out. But, until it
does, it is clear to liberal theorists that, whatever else such striking
workers are doing, they are expressing their beliefs and views and
communicating information. Before the Charter became the law of
the land, such activity was protected to some extent by specific
legislation. Inasmuch as it was not specifically protected, courts took
a dim view of it because it tended to interfere with existing
contractual and commercial relations.
1 6
16 The list of critical writings on the courts' uses of torts law and on their hostility to
secondary boycotts and picketing, because this conduct interfered with contractual and
commercial relations, is a long one. The following are representative only. J. Finkelman,
"The Law of Picketing in Canada" (1937-38) 2 U.T.LJ. 67; B. Laskin, "Picketing: A
Comparison of Certain Canadian and American Doctrines" (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 10;
A.W.R. Carrothers, "Recent Developments in Tort Law Picketing" (1957) 35 Can. Bar Rev.
1990]
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In Dolphin, workers were engaged in a lawful strike against
employer A. They set up communication posts - pickets - outside
employer B's business. The workers believed that employer B was
doing struck work. Employer B sought to have the court enjoin the
workers from picketing its place of business. Given the
entrenchment of the freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the
Charter and the fact that, when strikers communicate information and
seek to persuade other citizens to help them, it is commonly
acknowledged that they are exercising their right of free speech,
should employer B have been given its injunctive relief? The
Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial court's granting of an
injunction to employer B. Its reasoning was that the Charter does
not apply to disputes which are fought in the private realm. The
injunction in issue was being sought by one private economic actor to
inhibit the conduct of a number of other private economic actors.
The holding means that, if a legislature or the executive seeks to
inhibit freedom of expression, the courts might restrain it because its
action takes away a precious fundamental right. It also means that
that same precious right can be crushed by a private actor. Indeed,
the court is to help such a denial of freedom of expression at the
behest of a private repressor of free speech. After all, employer B
in Dolphin had to ask the court for positive action to get the relief
it sought; a judge had to make an order on its behalf. The Supreme
Court of Canada did not find this too problematic. It characterized
courts as helpless actors: if the state of the private law justified the
granting of an injunction, a court had no option but to give it. It was
not for judges to make or unmake law; they were not state actors,
merely interpreters and appliers of law within a confined setting
regulated by internally generated principles of reasoning.
The cat was threatening to crawl out of the bag. The
Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in these cases seemed to
indicate that judges have not changed their stripes despite the advent
of the Charter. They still do not believe workers ought to have a
1005; E.E. Palmer, "The Short, Unhappy Life of the 'Aristocratic' Doctrine" (1959-60) 13
U.T.L.J. 166; H.W. Arthurs, 'Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada: Some Problems of Judicial
Workmanship" (1960) 38 Can. Bar Rev. 346; D.M. Beatty, "Secondary Boycotts: A Functional
Analysis" (1974) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 388; G. England, "Some Thoughts on Secondary Picketing"
in G. England & G. Lerner eds, Essays in Collective Bargaining and Industrial Democracy
(Toronto: CCH Canadian, 1983) at 71.
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right to strike and still characterize the right to trade as more
important than the right to speak. Indeed, in the right to strike
cases, the greater plurality of judges, led by LeDain J., argued that
the right to strike was not a fundamental right and, therefore, not
worthy of protection from legislative manipulation, precisely because
the courts had not created it. It was a recent invention of the
legislatures and, therefore, not a fundamental right in our society.
The lesson is obvious. Courts are not willing to protect now what
they have always fought against with all their vigour. The same
lesson can be taken from Dolphin. There the Court's upholding of
the grant of the injunction depended on the total respect it accorded
the pro-capitalist and anti-working class rights carved out by the
judges over time. The Charter's broad language had not in any way
diminished the Supreme Court of Canada's admiration for the
judiciary's century-old handiwork.
To those who see the Charter as an obstacle to democratic
politics, these decisions were grist for the mill. Fudge 17 has argued
persuasively how these results were predictable because the courts
were fulfilling their institutional role as defenders of private property
and contract rights. Arthurs,18 in less class-based terms, argued that
nothing else could have been expected from an anti-collectivist
judiciary. Others19 have castigated these decisions for their internally
conflicting reasoning, suggesting that it was the Supreme Court of
Canada's intuitive antipathy to collective action by workers which led
it to reach out for arguments which do not stand up to analysis. An
argument similar in nature, in that it decries the analytical
incompetence of the courts, is made by the more extreme defenders
of the Charter and the judiciary. Beatty has angrily denounced the
Supreme Court of Canada's position in Dolphin because of its failure
to subject judges to the strictures of the Charter. He sees this as an
unacceptable evisceration of the Charter's potential, giving
unnecessary ammunition to those critics who already had argued that
17 J. Fudge, "Labour, The New Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" in Labour Law
under the Charter (Kingston: Queen's Law Journal and Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's
University, 1988) at 61.
18 H.W. Arthurs, "'The Right to Golf': Reflection on the Future of Workers, Unions
and the Rest of Us under the Charter' in Labour Law Under the Charter, ibid. at 17.
19 AJ. Petter & PJ. Monahan, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1986-87
Term" (1988) 10 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 61.
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judges should not be given too much power.20 In respect of the right
to strike cases, Beatty and Kennett 21 have argued that it is not too
late for the judiciary to change its mind at the Supreme Court of
Canada level. They believe it should. They have taken issue with
MacIntyre J.'s understanding of the law, but not with the principles
which they believe to underpin his approach. 2  Having found
MacIntyre J. to be wrong in law, Beatty and Kennett pointed to the
two dissents, those by Dickson C.J. and Wilson J., both of whom had
found that "freedom of association" meant that the legality of union
formation for the purpose of collective bargaining implied that union
members had a right to strike. While it is true that Dickson C.J.
thought that the curtailment of such a right might well be justified -
indeed, was justified in two out of the three cases before him - the
recognition of the constitutional protection given to that right by two
Supreme Court of Canada justices left the way open, in Beatty and
Kennett's view, for a newly constituted Supreme Court to reach a
different result.23 The fact that there was equivocal language and
20 D.M. Beatty, "Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority of the Courts" (1987)
37 U.T.L.J. 183.
21 D.M. Beatty & S. Kennett, "Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protests and
Political Participation in Free and Democratic Societies" in Labour Law Under the Charter,
supra, note 17 at 214. These writers felt so strongly about their argument that they had this
article republished, presumably so that more lawyers and judges would be likely to read it; see
"Striking Back: Fighting Words, Social Protest and Political Participation in Free and
Democratic Societies" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 573. This tells us something of the angst
raised amongst Charter proponents by these labour rights' decisions.
22 Maclntyre 3. had reasoned that Charter rights were only meant to enhance rights
which individuals could exercise lawfully by themselves and, as an individual could not strike,
there could be no Charter-based right to strike. Beatty and Kennett simply said that
individuals could strike at common law. This is an imaginative, if untenable, argument.
Whatever the plausibility of the Beatty/Kennett argument in law (and it is slight), it is unreal.
The claim to the right to strike arises because collectivities of people without property were
formed to render a cessation of work, which would otherwise be pointless, effective. A single
individual's cessation of work has no economic or political importance, unless he is a Gretzky.
I pause here to make a debating point. The nature of legal argument is that reaching out for
any plausible argument to buttress a decision is a permissible tactic. Thus, well-intentioned
people seeking to set aside conclusions reached by, what they perceive to be, ignorant or
badly-motivated judges, are content to use the same kinds of poorly-founded arguments which
the judges they criticize employed. This illustrates nicely the malleability of the judicial
methodology and the futility of relying on the constraints of an internally binding set of
principles as a means to keep a well-instructed judiciary within acceptable bounds.
23 Should a union ever be foolish enough to gamble its scarce resources and political
legitimacy on such tendentious reasoning!
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two strong dissents in the right to strike cases, then, suggests, to
whomsoever wants to believe it, that there is a potential for
progressive labour decisions by the judiciary under the Charter. a
more liberal-minded set of appointees to the benches could do the
trick.
This optimism about the Charter's potential, despite the actual
results in the labour rights cases, was supported by another line of
reasoning. Those who wanted to do so could, and did, treat these
decisions not as examples of a reactionary judiciary's adherence to its
anti-working class bias but, rather, as encouraging exercises of judicial
deference. This argument posits that the Supreme Court of Canada,
understanding its proper role, had given the democratic arm of the
state, the legislature, as much room as possible. The Court had not
succumbed to the temptation, held out by the Charter, to act
arrogantly and anti-democratically. 24 While this line of reasoning is
unconvincing because it presumes that not to strike down legislation
is a form of inaction, the kind of reasoning which is reminiscent of
the empty distinction drawn in other spheres between omissions and
commissions, it put another argument on the table which diminished
the force of the challenge mounted by critics in light of the results in
the right to strike cases and in Dolphin. Given the conventional
wisdom which likes to portray our legal world as a consensual, albeit
pluralistic, one rather than a conflictual one, and given the
accompanying low interest in labour relations and social economic
rights' struggles,2 5 the cat was, somewhat awkwardly, stuffed back into
24 See, for example, J. Kilcoyne, "Developments in Employment Law:. The 1986-87 Term"
(1988) 10 Sup. Ct L Rev. 183.
25 Charter proponents are vociferous in their opposition to censorship and agonize about
the limits on free speech which, they acknowledge, must be imposed. Thus it is that
questions, such as whether or not the state should be allowed to control pornography or nazi
publications, are treated by them as if they dealt with the very fabric of democracy. Yet,
when workers are told that they are not to read anything but employer and industry literature
during their coffee and lunch break, lest their own choice of reading pollutes their minds and
they become distracted or recalcitrant (as was the case at a papermill in Northern Ontario in
1987) the issue is not seen as one raising civil liberty issues. To Charter proponents,
conditions of employment and political freedom seem to be unconnected. In a similar way,
Charter advocates seldom, if ever, refer to the labour law cases which have been brought under
the Charter when they trumpet its virtues. For instance, when listing the achievements of the
Charter, in what now seems to be the routine birthday celebration of the Charter, Harold Levy
listed 10 significant cases; see The Toronto Star (16 April 1989). While the list contained such
important decisions as the one which guaranteed corporations the freedom to practice
whatever religion their non-existing souls desired, no mention was made of any of the Supreme
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the bag. Inasmuch as there were some nagging doubts amongst
advocates of the judiciary as an institution capable of reflecting the
best elements of societal values when armed with the Charter, they
were soon dispelled by the decision in Morgentaler. Whatever the
import of that decision, it was like a warm bath of words and
soothing sounds for those who put their faith in the Charter as a
valuable means by which to create a better society.26 The possibility
that courts would favour the ruling class when applying the Charter,
just as they did before the Charter, receded from view. Two recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, however, have brought it
back in sight. The cat is crawling out of that bag again.
Court of Canada's pronouncements on the collective rights of labour, even though by the time
of writing there had been 6 decisions by the Supreme Court in this sphere, all of which had
resulted in serious losses for labour. In part, the general lack of interest in labour relations
adumbrated above may explain this; in part, the awkwardness of the results in these cases for
those who are concerned with offering a rosy picture of the Charter, may underly the non-
selection of labour rights' cases. Given this disinterest in discussing labour rights' cases by
experts and afficionados, it is difficult to blame the media for their lack of coverage of labour
law cases decided under the Charter. Indeed, they may be excused all the more because, as
it happens, some of the major labour law decisions have been made public at a time when
much more exciting legal events were taking place. For instance, the right to strike decisions
were released in the same week that our anniversary of the filled-with promise section 15 (the
sweeping equality clause) was being celebrated, namely the week of April 17, 1987. The right
to strike cases were first argued in the Supreme Court of Canada on 25 June 1985. The
handing down of the decisions nearly two years later, during the week when it was likely that
public attention was going to be focussed on section 15, was quite a coincidence. Similarly,
the Dolphin Delivery decision was handed down the very same day as was the one in Edwards
Books and Arts Limited v. R., supra, note 12. The Supreme Court of Canada had been under
pressure to render its decision in Edwards before Christmas as leading retailers had announced
that they were willing to wait for the Court's pronouncement on Sunday closing until
Christmas, but that, thereafter, in the absence of a decision, they would violate a law whose
constitutionality was dubious and compliance with which would cause them to suffer losses.
The Supreme Court of Canada acted with uncharacteristic speed. The first arguments in
Edwards were heard on 4 March 1986. The decision was published on 18 December 1986,
seven months later, and a week before the Christmas deadline set by the retailers. The
decision in Dolphin Delivery also was released on 18 December 1986. Argument was first
heard on 6 December 1984, over two years before the date of the decision. The decision in
Dolphin Delivery received almost no coverage by the public media, whereas Edwards was front
page news. The fortuity of all of this is remarkable.
26 Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v. The Queen (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.).
The question of what the empirical impact of the decision has been or could be, as opposed
to what was said by the judges in reaching it, is much neglected by Charter supporters. A
recent report shows that it is questionable whether many more women now have ready access
to abortions than before; see "Abortion access depends on where you live" The Toronto Star
(28 January 1989) A4. This is not to say that the Morgentaler decision was not important,
particularly symbolically. But, even this symbolic advance may be lost if Parliament acts to
criminalize some abortions, as seems quite possible at this stage. The possibility of such
recriminalization was left open deliberately by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Contempt for Workers
VI. THE JUDICIARY COMES CLEAN: CHARTER OR NOT,
THERE ARE TO BE REAL LIMITATIONS ON WORKERS'
FREEDOM IN CANADA
In Newfoundland Association of Public Employees v. Attorney-
General for Newfoundland and Chafe,27 a union of governmental
employees was engaged in a lawful strike. Some of these employees
were court workers. The union picketed a court house. Chafe, one
of the union's members, who was a bailiff, decided to go to work.
He crossed his union's picket line. The union, an association formed
by the voluntary agreement of its members, had a set of agreed-upon
by-laws, one of which provided that the union was entitled to
discipline any member who crossed a picket line during a lawful
strike. In accordance with this by-law, the union set a trial date for
Chafe. Chafe was joined by the Attorney-General of Newfoundland
in an application for an injunction which would restrain the union
from holding a trial which might lead to the discipline of Chafe.
They succeeded on the basis that, regardless of the motivation of the
picketers, an attempt to stop judicial officers from carrying out their
duties is an interference with the administration of justice. This, said
the courts, is always a matter of serious public concern. Hence,
Newfoundland's Attorney-General had standing to seek the
injunction. It was granted to him because such an interference with
the administration of justice threatens the supremacy of law and,
therefore, constitutes a contempt of court. It followed that the
union's intent to discipline a court worker for carrying out his
responsibility to the legal system was restrainable. The Supreme
Court of Canada was unanimous in upholding the grant of the
injunction and the reasoning which underlay it.
In the companion British Columbia case,28 the legal issue
raised was the same, although the basic facts differed. Again, a union
of public servants which included court workers was engaged in a
legal strike. Court houses were picketed. McEachern C.J.S.C., a
trial judge, coming to work early, saw the picket line outside his court
house, went to his chambers and wrote out an interim restraining
27 (1988), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 204 [hereinafter NAPE].
2 8 Brtish Columbia Government Employees' Union v. Attorney General of British Columbia,
Attorney General of Canada, Intervener (1988), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 [hereinafter BCGEU].
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order which he issued in court, without anyone having asked for such
an order. It forbad picketing. The union removed the picketers and,
two days later, as permitted, returned to show why the interim
injunction should not be made permanent. The trial judge upheld his
own restraining order. His arguments stood the test of appeals.
Indeed, his arguments were relied on in the Newfoundland case.
29
They were that, whether intended or not, the picket line interfered
with the administration of justice and that this constituted a criminal
contempt of court, one which could not be tolerated, even if this
meant the curtailing of the freedom of speech of workers. Again, the
Supreme Court of Canada agreed with this reasoning.
The bottom line of these decisions, then, was the denial of yet
another entrenched right (this time freedom of speech) to workers.
The Supreme Court of Canada, once again, had not seen fit to
enhance the imperfect political rights of Canadians. Moreover, in
coming to its conclusions, it paid but scant attention to the factual
situations before it and appears to have been insouciant of the need
to make its arguments internally coherent. The decisions provide
little comfort for the proponents of the judiciary as an institution
comprised of capable crafts' people imbued with the spirit to create
a better world as envisaged by the Charter. Indeed, it is hard to see
these decisions as anything but untrammelled expressions of the
courts' sense of self-importance, inflated by their new role under the
Charter, and as evidence of their continued anti-working class biases.
A brief discussion of the Supreme Court of Canada's ability to handle
legal logic and of the vision with which the Charter has imbued it, as
revealed by the arguments and holdings in these two cases, follows.
A. Contempt of Court
The Supreme Court in Canada found that, since ancient
times, courts have used contempt of court as a means by which to
preserve the supremacy of law. Case law and learned authors were
29 The Newfoundland Court of Appeal expressly approved the reasoning offered by
McEachern C.J.S.C. in Re British Columbia Government Employees' Union andAttomey General
of British Columbia (1985), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 705 (B.C. S.C.T.D.); see Newfoundland Association
of Public Employees v. Attorney General for Newfoundland (1984), 14 D.L.R. (4th) 323 at 329-
30 and 334-36 (Nfld C.A.).
[VOL. 28 NO. 1
Contempt for Workers
cited. There were no directly analogous cases to the ones before it.
But, one of the texts on which the Supreme Court of Canada relied
treated both the obstruction of persons officially connected with the
court and the prevention of public access to the courts as residual
categories of criminal contempt.30  The Court did note that the
author's inclusion of these residual categories had relied on an
Australian case which had no factual similarity to the picketing cases
before the Supreme Court of Canada. It was not concerned,
however, by this lack of judicial authority for the text-writer's
assertions. It held that the particular activities before it - which fell
in the text-writer's residual categories - to be contumacious. It must
be acknowledged, however, that despite the lack of persuasive judicial
precedent, this finding is not very surprising because there is no
question but that the courts always have used the criminal contempt
power to stamp out interferences with the administration of justice,
as defined by them3 On the other hand, there is also no doubt that
there is a danger that the contempt of court power could easily be
used by courts to suppress what ought to be tolerable dissent.
Indeed, some commentators have argued that courts have not used
the contempt power to protect the maintenance of an independent
administration of justice, available to all, but rather to aggrandize
themselves, to still criticism or to achieve political goals which favour
30 CJ. Miller, Contempt of Court, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), cited, quoted
and discussed in BCGEU, supra, note 28 at 235.
31 The Court was not worried about the fact that courts have been the creators of the
criteria for the definition of contempt, as well as the interpreters of these criteria, nor by the
fact that the criteria, as set out in the British Columbia decision, are rather vague. In other
circumstances, however, courts have been known to be wary of coercive powers granted to
agencies such as censorship boards. The courts feel that these agencies should be kept under
control by being subjugated to relatively explicit guidelines; see Re Ontario Film & Video
Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors (1983), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 766 (Ont. C.A.).
The fact that judges trust themselves, while they view other decision-making bodies with
distrust, is also reflected by another aspect of the McEachern C..S.C. judgment. In deciding
how much evidence was required to prove that the interference with the administration of
justice amounted to a contempt of court, the learned judge noted that the jurisprudence
showed that there had to be a cognizable danger and that what amounted to a cognizable
danger lay in the eye of the beholder, namely, the judge; see (1988), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 705 at
720-22. This was not perceived as creating a problem, one which raised the possibility of
abuse of power by an unaccountable agency.
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one group over another3 2 There is no reference to this literature in
these Supreme Court of Canada decisions. Apparently, the Court
was sanguine that its use of the coercive contempt power in the cases
before it did not give rise to the perception of abuse, even though it
did fetter newly constitutionally enshrined political rights, the
freedoms to assemble and to speak.
B. The Restraining Order
To lay the foundation for the restraining order, it was
necessary for the trial judges to find that what would otherwise have
been treated as legal picketing by workers did in fact constitute an
interference with the administration of justice. On the face of it, but
only on the face of it, this was relatively easy to do in the
Newfoundland case because there had been an attempt by the union
to punish a court official for doing his job.33 In the British Columbia
case, however, it had to be argued that the picket line would cause
people - whether this was intended or not - not to do business in
the courts. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the trial
judge and the Court of Appeal that a picket line would have this
effect, even though the supporting evidence for this conclusion had
been scant at the trial. In particular, the only evidence touching on
this was an affidavit by a Crown official who had asserted that the
32 On the chilling effect of the use of the contempt power, see R. Martin, "Criticizing
the Judges" (1982) 28 McGill L.J. 1. For an account which shows how courts developed and
enhanced the contempt power to achieve certain political goals, see D. Hay, "Contempt by
Scandalizing the Court: A Political History of the First Hundred Years" (1987) 25 Osgoode
Hall LJ. 431. For an insight into how judges may well abuse their power to restrict free
speech in order to safeguard their legitimacy, even when it means fettering other judges, see
J. Webber, "The Limit to Judges' Free Speech: A Comment on the Report of the Committee
of Investigation into the Conduct of the Hon. Mr. Justice Berger" (1984) 29 McGill L.J. 369.
33 Unsurprisingly the Newfoundland Court of Appeal spent some effort on deciding
whether Chafe was a court official, as well as a government employee. Presumably, classifying
him as a court official made it easier to believe that the exertion of pressure on him not to
cross a picket line constituted an interference with the administration of justice than it would
have been if he had been characterized as an ordinary employee in conflict with his employer,
in this instance, the government of the day.
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picket line was orderly and peaceful. Persons appearing to have business inside the
Courthouse entered and left the building at will and at no time appeared to be
impeded in any way by the picketers.
3 4
Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada's conclusion that the picket line
had constituted "a deliberate course of conduct which could only
result in massive disruption of the court process of British
Columbia,"35 was based on a very frail foundation. This cavalier
attitude towards facts, plus the transparently poor legal reasoning
used by the Supreme Court of Canada and the lower courts in these
cases, suggests something about the judges' agenda: they were
determined to reach the result they did. The way the judges made
their arguments made it crystal clear that they were not going to be
bound by the rules of formal legal logic.
The courts accepted it to be an incontrovertible fact that a
picket line is a solid barrier which will not be crossed by anyone.
The Supreme Court of Canada put it bluntly:
A picket line ipso facto impedes proper access to justice. It interferes with such
access and is intended to do so. A picket line has great powers of influence as a
form of coercion.
3 6
In support, the Court cited a well-known passage from Heather Hill
Appliances Ltd. v. McCormack:
The picket line has become the sign and symbol of trade union solidarity and
gradually became a barrier - intangible but none the less real. It has now become
a matter of faith and morals and an obligation of conscience not to breach the
picket line and this commandment is obeyed not only by fellow employees of the
picketers but by all true believers who belong to other trade unions which may have
no quarrel at all with the employer who is picketed.
3 7
First, note that this case was decided in 1966 and that the quoted
passage contained the kind of assumption which gave credibility to
the argument, so often made by labour law commentators of the
34 This affidavit was referred to specifically by the Supreme Court of Canada in BCGEU,
supra, note 28 at 220-21.
35 Ibid. at 248.
36 Ibid. at 231. The same statement is also found in the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in the Newfoundland case where it is offered as a quotation from the trial judge's
decision in NAPE, supra, note 27 at 212.
37 (1966), [1966] 1 O.R. 12 (Ont. H.C.) at 13. Cited by the Supreme Court of Canada
in the NAPE case, supra, note 27 at 212, and in the BCGEU case, supra, note 28 at 231.
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period, that courts had remained anti-worker, anti-trade union, and
anti-collective bargaining, despite the clear legislative intention found
in collective bargaining law to the effect that collective bargaining
and picketing should be tolerated as a matter of public policy. In
those bad old days critics frequently lamented the fact that courts
would take judicial notice of the fact that picket lines would not be
crossed by anyone and that these failures to cross would lead to
breaches of contract or interferences with commercial relations. This
allowed them to grant injunctions which fettered union activities,
even though there often was no evidence that there was a contract
which might be affected by the picketing activity.38 Yet, as can be
seen, none of these vehement arguments39 seem to have penetrated
the consciousness of the judges who sat in the contempt cases, even
though the logic of these arguments was bolstered by the Charter's
guarantees of freedom of speech, association, and assembly.
Remarkably, none of the courts in the contempt cases hesitated for
even a fleeting moment before accepting the validity of the doctrines
developed by common law courts over the centuries, doctrines which
had given rise to so much heated criticism by academics and policy-
makers.
As well as referring to what ought to have been discredited
jurisprudence, the judges also relied on a. paragraph written by the
well-known commentator and former British Columbia Labour
Relations Board chairman, P. Weiler, to buttress their stance. Weiler
had written that a picket line induced a Pavlovian response, namely,
an automatic refusal to cross picket lines by unionists as soon as they
38 I.M. Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of Tort: A Comparative Study of the
Law in England and Canada, (Kingston: Industrial Relation's Centre, Queen's University,
1967); S.A. Tagon, Tort Liability in a Collective Bargaining Regime (Toronto: Butterworths,
1980).
39 In large part, it was this vigorous critique - which was given strength by periods of
serious labour unrest from 1965-1972 during which courts had granted injunctions wholesale
- which had led to the formulation of the British Columbia Labour Code, S.B.C. 1973, c. 122.
For the anxiety created by judicial activism and the development of the kinds of reforms which
were to be found in the British Columbia Labour Code, see The Report of the Task Force
on Labour Relations (The Woods Task Force), Canadian Industrial Relations (Ottawa: Privy
Council Office, 1968). For an account of how the drafters of that Code sought to marginalize
the obstreperous courts, see H.W. Arthurs, "'The Dullest Bill:' Reflections on the Labour
Code of British Columbia" (1974) 9 U.B.C. L. Rev. 280.
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saw one.4 ° In the contempt cases the judges took this ex catedra
statement to be gospel. This is peculiar since there is much evidence
that judges hold the belief that many people would cross picket lines
if they deemed it safe to do so. It is, after all, this belief which
justifies the many orders they issue which permit the maintenance of
picket lines provided the union limits the number of people on the
picket lines. A line which merely communicates information, and
which can be seen to do just that, will be permitted to continue its
activities by the courts because, while some people may not cross it,
others are likely to feel free to do so if they are not physically
intimidated. Moreover, there is ample evidence that this is a sensible
assumption: people do cross picket lines. Indeed, note that in one
of the contempt cases before the Supreme Court of Canada, the one
which arose in Newfoundland, there was a legal problem to be solved
precisely because an employee who was a member of the union had
crossed the picket line.41 Even if it is believed that, on balance, the
Supreme Court of Canada was justified in accepting Weiler's
assessment that unionists do not like crossing picket lines and that
they rarely do this, it might have read Weiler's edict with more care.
After all, Weiler began his statement, as cited by the Supreme Court
of Canada, as follows:
The crucial variable determining the impact of power of peaceful picketing is
whether it is addressed to unionized workers. That kind of picket line operates as
a signal, telling union members not to cross.
4 2
Weiler went on to say that not to cross a picket line was a symbol of
a political commitment to solidarity, an essential component of a
bargaining strategy aimed at enhancing all workers' rights. From this
perspective it is easy to understand why unions have by-laws which
require their members to respect picket lines and which they want to
40 P. Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law (Toronto:
Carswell, 1980) at 79.
41 Collective agreements frequently contain clauses which permit employees to honour
lawful picket lines at the place where they are employed. Such clauses, on their face, violate
the statutory peace obligation and their validity is, therefore, a contentious matter, see DJ.M.
Brown & D.M. Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 2d ed.(Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1984)
at 7:3640. Presumably, then, in the absence of such clauses, people are expected to honour
the picket lines, and unions know that employers may punish workers who abide by the
unions' requests not to do so, making it difficult to enforce trade union discipline.
4 2 BCGEU, supra, note 28 at 232 (emphasis added).
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enforce strictly.43 The reliance on Weiler's statement as warranting
the factual finding the Supreme Court of Canada needed to come to
to reach the decision it did in the British Columbia case, was flawed
by reading it out of context and without reference to the facts before
the Court. After all, the Supreme Court of Canada did not conclude
that access to the courts by fellow unionists would be impeded by the
union's picket line and that, therefore, a restraining order was
warranted. Rather it held that people such as litigants, lawyers,
witnesses, jurors, and sureties, as well as members of the general
public, might not cross the picket line. This is a long step away from
the only inference which could be drawn from the Weiler statement,
viz., that unionists who desire to develop solidarity amongst
themselves will rarely cross a picket line. Note further that the
passage from the Heather Hill Appliances Ltd case, relied on by the
Supreme Court of Canada, also was restricted to the situation where
unionists were faced by a picket line. Just as Weiler did not, the
court in the Heather HillAppliances case did not purport to hold that
non-unionists would honour a picket line automatically.
As if all of this is not enough to cast doubt on the courts'
reasoning abilities and motives, let it be noted that there was no
evidence of any kind that litigants, lawyers, witnesses, sureties or
members of the public were not going to cross the picket lines
outside the court houses in St. Johns and Vancouver. Indeed, in the
Newfoundland case, the court house was picketed for the duration of
the public servants' strike. It ended on 26 September 1978, having
lasted three weeks. The factum of NAPE (the union) set out the
following facts, none of which were contradicted by evidence offered,
43 The Supreme Court of Canada also should have noted that Weiler was talking about
British Columbia, a province with a distinct history of union solidarity. It might have been
prudent for the Court to consider whether or not Weiler's appraisal could be applied, without
qualification, to the Newfoundland situation where unions have had a much tougher road to
hoe over time. It is also pertinent to note that the judges, at all levels in these two cases,
seemed only too keen to accept Professor Weiler's notion of a Pavlovian response. This fitted
in with their intuitions about workers, that is, that workers react like unthinking mobs and
masses. It bolstered their view that collective activity should be regulated strictly. It is easier
to issue restraining orders if one believes that all that is being restrained is unthinking activity.
This is a good lesson as to why academics, reaching for dramatic impact, should not use
words lightly. Would even the strongest critics of judicial behaviour write, in those terms,
about the Pavlovian response of judges when faced with a picket line? Is this kind of criticism
not likely to be cast in less pejorative and derogatory language?
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either by the Attorney-General of Newfoundland or by Mr. Chafe,
the successful applicants for an injunction:
(i) there was no evidence of any person having been denied access to the court
while the picket lines were up;
(ii) Mr. Chafe, the trade union member crossed the picket line to do his work as
a bailiff on 18 September 1978;
(iii) the trade union resolved to proceed against Mr. Chafe on 17 October 1978,
that is, three weeks after the picket lines had been removed;
(iv) the date set for the trade union disciplinary hearing was 12 December 1978,
on which date the applicants were granted an ex parte injunction which was
made permanent on 10 January 1979.
4 4
There was no evidence of any kind that the administration of justice
had been impeded in any way by the picket lines. Indeed,
uncontroverted facts before the courts indicated the very opposite
had been true.45 In these circumstances, the bald acceptance by all
the members of the judiciary involved in the Newfoundland case of
the assertion that picket lines ipso facto interfered with access to
businesses, workplaces, governmental services, and courts, is very
troublesome. How, then, in light of the frail factual evidence before
it in both cases, did the Supreme Court of Canada satisfy itself that
the picket lines in Newfoundland and British Columbia were
contumacious?
When dealing with the British Columbia case, the Supreme
Court of Canada made the same assumptions as did the trial judge,
McEachern C.J.S.C., when he dismissed the British Columbia
Government Employees' Union's case to have the interim restraining
order set aside. McEachern C.J.S.C. had held that his wisdom in
granting the interim order had been proved by the fact that a number
of trials had been successfully conducted after the picket lines had
been dissolved. He listed the following triumphs:
In New Westminster Toy J. was able to continue a most difficult case and McKenzie
J. was able to commence and complete the tragic case of R v. Blaclnan where a
young man was found not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of murdering six
members of his family; Trainor J. continued a difficult murder trial in Cranbrook;
Davies J. held a criminal assize at Prince Rupert; Callaghan J. held a civil assize at
Mr. Randell J. Earle, counsel for NAPE, provided me with the contents of the factum
and other data. His kind co-operation is deeply appreciated.
45 Mr. Earle indicated to me that the purpose of the strike was not to stop citizens from
crossing the picket lines, but to let them cross and find that the government or courts were
not able to deliver services. The hope was that they would become angry with the employers
because of their refusal to deal fairly with the workers, just as the picketers were claiming.
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Nanaimo; Lander, Finch and Wood J.J. were able to commence or continue jury.
trials in Vancouver, and all the other busy work of this court at Vancouver was
carried on. The County Court of Vancouver was able to carry on its usual work as
well as complete jury selections in criminal cases involving the attendance of upwards
of 460 jurors; and, so far as I know, most of the work of all courts in most locations
of the province was carded on.
46
McEachern C.J.S.C. and the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to
assume that the picket lines might have prevented the hearing of
such cases. Clearly the judges felt that the fact that some people
might not have crossed the picket lines was enough to warrant this
conclusion. In the end, it was this possibility of harm, as opposed to
tangible evidence of harm, which was balanced against the rights of
the picketers. The finding against the picketing in these
circumstances raises some interesting questions.
One such question is why it is that the judges, who were so
worried lest witnesses, jurors, litigants, lawyers, and sureties might be
intimidated, did not consider the possibility that some people might
have liked the option of not crossing a picket line which espoused a
cause they wanted to support? That is, such people might have
relished an opportunity to exercise their political rights as Canadian
citizens, even it this meant that they might not be able to fulfil any
obligations they owed the judicial system. Enjoining all picketing
outside the court house and thereby denying people the opportunity
to exercise their rights as full citizens was not calculated to advance
the integrity of the administration of justice, a system supposedly
dedicated to the liberty of the individual.
Another question arises. Forcing the union to remove all its
pickets was a bit like using a power-driven pulverizer to crush an ant.
After all, if some people whose attendance in court was deemed
essential for the conduct of a fair trial in fact had decided not to
cross a picket line because they thought it more important to honour
such a request than to attend at court, or because they had been
susceptible to Pavlovian training which induced them not to cross
picket lines, or because they really were intimidated, would a court
not have had ample power to command the presence of such
individuals? Given the lack of tangible evidence of interference with
the administration of justice, was there anything which prevented
46 Supra, note 29 at 713-14. The Supreme Court of Canada reproduced this passage in
full in BCGEU, supra, note 28 at 226.
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McEachern C.J.S.C. from adopting a 'wait and see" approach, and to
act promptly only when it was truly necessary? This would have
ensured that both access to the courts would be unimpeded and that
union members would have been granted an opportunity to exercise
their freedoms of speech and assembly. This possible way of handling
the problem deserved consideration because the evidence before
McEachern C.J.S.C. was that the union was going to do everything
in its power to make sure that people who felt that they had to go to
court were not to be harassed unduly by the picket line. The union
had agreed to accommodate people who felt badly about crossing a
picket line, such as, say, Law Union lawyers, by giving them a pass.
This pass would be a declaration that the union appreciated that they
were supporters rather than scabs. In the absence of evidence of
intimidation and harassment, and knowing that union supporters
would find it easy to cross the picket line, the complete prohibition
issued by the court seems to have been an over-reaction.
In view of these and like arguments, it is not surprising that
the courts sought to give added strength to their decisions by relying
on a motherhood-like argument. In the British Columbia case, the
Supreme Court of Canada reasoned that, should any witness, juror,
surety, lawyer, or litigant have been dissuaded from coming to court
by picketers, adjournments might have been necessitated and "justice
delayed is justice denied. 4 7 As noted, the union was doing its best
to ensure that there would be no serious delay by giving out passes
to anyone troubled by having to cross a picket line. But, presumably,
it was the principle of the matter which concerned the Court, not the
facts: the possibility of any delay was perceived as an unacceptable
evil. Yet, given the nature of the cases before it, there is something
ironic about the Supreme Court of Canada stressing that any delay at
all amounted to a denial of justice.
In the British Columbia case the initial restraining order had
been issued in the fall of 1983. It was not until five years later, on
20 October 1988, that the Supreme Court of Canada handed down
its decision in the case. In this respect, the Newfoundland case is
even more remarkable. The initial restraining order was issued on
12 December 1978. The Supreme Court of Canada decision came
almost ten years later, again on 20 October 1988. While the initial
4 7 Supra, note 28 at 232.
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decisions to issue injunctions were made without any delay at all, the
final determination came so long after the events that the unions
would have lost even if they had obtained favourable decisions. No
sensible remedy could have been fashioned to redress the harm done.
Thus, speed, not delay, might well have led to a denial of justice in
these cases. This is typical of labour injunction cases, a fact which
must have been well understood by the Supreme Court of Canada.
In the past, courts were much criticized for the ease with which they
granted ex parte injunctions in labour disputes. Timing is of the
essence during a strike and once a picket line has been dissolved, the
employer gains an immediate advantage in the bargaining situation.
48
While it is somewhat ironical that courts rely on the argument
that justice delayed is justice denied to support a result where justice
might have been denied because one of the protagonists' access to
the courts was facilitated too much, it is true that, as a general
principle, delay is a bad thing and that courts should discourage it.
Indeed, since 1982, the Charter has made the failure to bring an
accused to trial without delay a violation of the accused's
constitutional rights. But, in interpreting this provision, the courts
have had to balance a variety of factors. Thus, an explicit or implied
waiver of time periods by the accused or the time requirements
inherent in the nature of the case, or limitations on institutional
resources, all might be acceptable justifications for delay.49 Thus,
while courts generally frown upon delay, they acknowledge that some
delays which cause some hardship are acceptable. It is not easy to
believe that potential delays caused by court house picketing would
lead to a quantum leap in the scope of denial of access to the courts,
one likely to bring the judicial system into more disrepute than other
kinds of delay already have done. Rather, what was manifestly
intolerable to the courts in the contempt of court cases was the cause
of the delay. This shone through the judgments and reveals a great
deal about the judges' sense of self-importance and the persistence of
their anti-collective working-class feelings.
48 The courts' willingness to use their injunctive power to aid employers, especially in the
1960s, is well-documented; see A-W.R. Carrothers & E.E. Palmer, Report of a Study on the
Labour Injunction in Ontario (Toronto: Ont. Dept. of Labour, 1966).
4 9 Mills v. The Queen (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; Rahey v. The Queen (1987), [1987] 1
S.C.R. 588.
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It is clear that if the potential absence of people who ought
to be in court, such as lawyers, litigants, witnesses, jurors, or sureties,
amounts to an interference with the administration of justice, then
the actual absence of court workers would have this effect in spades.
In the contempt of court cases, the court workers were on lawful
strike. That is, they were legally absent from work, intending to
impede the work of the courts. The Supreme Court of Canada
acknowledged that these workers could not be faulted for any delays
arising out of their lawful strike activity.-" The courts were stymied:
the legislature had deliberately chosen to give these workers the right
to strike, that is, to interfere with the administration of justice.51 It
would thus have been an overtly political act for the court to hold
that these court workers were in contempt by staying away from
work, one going to the root of the question as to who wielded
political power in the land. It was this which inhibited the Supreme
Court of Canada. So inhibited, the Court set about showing that,
inasmuch as it had not been clearly forbidden from saying how a
lawful strike should be conducted, it was going to be "maitre chez-
nous."
The Supreme Court of Canada argued that, even if to cause
delay was not the intent of the union when it picketed, any resulting
delay was to be treated as an unacceptable interference with the
administration of justice. As we know that, to the judicial mindset,
a picket line is bound to lead to delay, even though it requires other
people than the picketers to make an independent decision to
honour the picket line before it can have this effect and even though
the union in British Columbia had made serious efforts to ensure that
every person who needed to attend court would feel free to do so,
we cannot be too surprised by the fact that the Supreme Court of
Canada found that delay would be caused by the picket lines and that
it was the kind of delay which could not be tolerated. Yet, the
50 McEachern CJ.C.S. was not so clear on this point. He noted that, fortunately, the
issue was not before him and that he did not have to resolve it. But, both in the
Newfoundland case and in the British Columbia case, the Supreme Court of Canada pointed
out that it did not want to comment adversely on the conduct of workers who were exercising
their lawful right not to work.
51 The legislatures could easily have said that these workers were essential workers. They
have done so in respect of many government workers who, therefore, are not entitled to strike.
Indeed, in the strikes which gave rise to the contempt cases, supervisors were legislatively
prohibited from striking and they continued to work in the courts at all relevant times.
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reasoning the Court used was strained. The extremist nature of the
argument can be gauged from the fact that there are many other
things which cause delay and poor access to the courts:
(1)the unpreparedness of lawyers, leading to adjournments;
(2)the difficulty of getting witnesses to court;
(3)the accommodation of expert witnesses who have busy schedules
which do not always fit in with the judicial ones;
(4)judges who work short hours and weeks;
(5)the lack of money for court rooms provided by the government;
(6) the lack of funds to attract an adequate number of court workers
and judges; and
(7) the lack of money of litigants.
The last two impediments to access to the courts are the most
intriguing for our purposes.
Recently, Ontario's provincial court judges have expressed
extreme frustration because their courts are dreadfully overcrowded,
and they believe that they cannot discharge their duties properly.
Their dissatisfaction has been aggravated by the fact that they feel
their salaries have neither kept pace with those of superior court
judges nor with the cost of living increases, in large part because the
government-paymaster had refused to implement an independent
commission's recommendation for substantial increases. In short, the
judges were venting their unhappiness with their conditions of work.
Like all workers who have come to feel that their pleas for relief are
falling on deaf ears, they have become more militant: they are
threatening "job action." Apparently, this would include a refusal to
adjourn cases. This would mean that the "counsel, police and
witnesses lined up in the hallways would have to wait until the cases
in front of them were completed." This could increase the existing
chaos and delays considerably. And Mr. Paul French, a lawyer
representing the judges in their negotiations, has stated that
"[a]nother option is the complete shutting down of courts to draw
the attention of the public to a situation that cannot go on any
longer."52 As far as I know, no government official representing the
52 K. Makin, "Provincial Court judges seek ways to push for better pay, conditions" 77te
[Toronto] Globe & Mail (14 April 1989) A14.
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public, nor any judge acting on her/his own motion, has come forward
to enjoin these potentially drastic interferences with access to the
justice system.
In a similar vein, the impecuniosity of litigants is not treated
as an interference with the administration of justice. The underlying
reasoning is that it is not the result of the intent of anyone that it
should be so. The lack of access to the administration of justice
because of people's poverty is the result of massive inequality in our
society. This is of no concern to the courts. Indeed, it is seen as so
natural by them - because it is economic in origin, the product of the
invisible hand - that it is not identified as something which interferes
with the administration of justice. It is not the result of a positive
act, although it is regrettable. On the other hand, when workers
attempt to change this status quo by getting more of the economic
pie for themselves, their attempts, especially when they involve
conduct which is aimed at the courts, are characterized as non-
natural, that is, as political. This is presumably so because they act
as a collectivity. Therefore it becomes a proper subject for
regulation, for restraint. Both the judiciary's understanding of the
world and its desire to maintain it as so understood are coming into
clearer focus.
In sum, the Supreme Court of Canada's finding that there
had been an interference with the administration of justice was far
from convincing. It rested on the assumption that lawyers, sureties,
litigants, and witnesses would not cross the picket lines, even though
both the legal and factual bases for this assumption were embedded
in quicksand. These threadbare decisions are best explained by the
Supreme Court of Canada's sense of self-esteem and anti-labour bias.
It is of some interest that this bias was displayed by a bench of the
Supreme Court of Canada, the majority of whose members would be
characterized as progressive by most observers.5 3 One could seek to
explain these decisions without reference to anti-worker bias by
arguing that, leaving aside the sloppy reasoning, they were consistent
with the Court's natural and instinctive protection of its authority and
legitimacy. But, this will not do. These decisions were made after
The only judges with conservative credentials were Estey J. (who took no part in the
decision-making) and McIntyre J. The others - Dickson CJ., Lamer, Wilson, LaForest, and
L'Heureux-Dube JJ. - are generally accepted as "progressive judges" whatever that term and
the term "conservative judges" mean in this context.
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the Charter. Courts are supposed to pay more respect to individual
liberty now than they did in the past. They should be expected to
subjugate their institutional interests more than they used to do.
After all, the proponents of the judiciary as an agency, and of the
Charter as an instrument for good, tell us that things have changed,
that courts will seek to perfect the personal and political rights of
Canadians. A better explanation must be offered. Perhaps it is to be
found in the last set of arguments made by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the contempt cases.
C. Freedom of Speech
The union in the British Columbia case had raised a number
of Charter issues. I will deal in detail only with the one involving
section 2(b) (freedom of speech).5 4
The courts could not question the argument that the picketing
involved speech, given their previous holdings. In the British
Columbia case, the Supreme Court of Canada wrote that picketing
1represents a highly important and now constitutionally recognized
54 Reliance on section 7 (denial of liberty) underpinned a union argument to the effect
that the injunction had denied liberty to it and to its members. The Supreme Court of
Canada held that, even if an injunction might have that effect, the order issued in the British
Columbia case only denied the unionists' constitutional right to liberty in a minimal way
because the union was permitted to come to court within twenty-four hours to dispute the
restraining order. The inhibition on liberty - if any - was de minimis, given the other rights
sought to be protected by the trial judge. The contentious issue as to how any violation of
a person's right to liberty could be de minimis is not taken up here. The union also relied
on section 11(a) (right to be informed without reasonable delay of a specific offence) and
section 11(d) (right to be presumed innocent, to have a fair trial by an independent tribunal).
The Supreme Court of Canada characterized the finding that the unionists were in contempt
as an exercise of an inherent judicial power. It did not involve a charge, nor an accusation
that the union had committed an offence. Hence, there had been no need for notice. As the
union had obeyed the order instantaneously - so much for its blatant attempt to interfere with
justice! - no charges were ever laid to punish the union for disobedience. Hence, the
Supreme Court of Canada argued there had been no violation of the presumption of
innocence. As for the lack of a fair trial by an independent tribunal, the Supreme Court of
Canada pointed out that McEachern C.J.S.C. had acted to guarantee that the people inside
the court house be given a fair trial by an independent tribunal by preventing interference
with access to the courts and that, therefore, it did not lie in the mouth of those who were
seeking to interfere with such fair trials by an independent tribunal to make a claim on this
basis. If this is not a classic bootstrap argument, then nothing is. The union also raised
section 2(c) (freedom of assembly) and section 11(c) (not to be compelled to be a witness)
but made no submissions in respect of section 2(c) to the Supreme Court of Canada and
dropped its argument based on section 11(c).
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form of expression in all contemporary labour disputes."55 It cited
Harrison v. Carswell5 6 for this proposition, although in that case the
Supreme Court of Canada had denied the union's right to picket
because it interfered with an owner's enjoyment of his private
property. But, of course, that denial of speech to protect private
property rights had occurred before the Charter. The important point
was that in Harrison v. Carswell the Supreme Court of Canada had
characterized picketing as involving speech. In the contempt cases,
a different approach to the extent of its protection might have been
expected, given the entrenched guarantee in section 2(b). But, we
know that the result was the same as that reached in Harrison v.
Carswell. Given the rather frail case made to substantiate the
argument that, inevitably, the picketing would impede access to the
courts and/or cause delays which would seriously interfere with the
administration of justice unless enjoined, the Supreme Court of
Canada had to find a legally acceptable formulation to hold that the
restraint on these picketers' exercise of free speech was at least as
justifiable as the reasoning which had justified the restraint in
Harrison v. Carswell in the bad old pre-Charter days.
The Court found the answer to the problem raised by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech in the Charter itself. The
argument was simple. The Charter asserts in its preamble that
"Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
... the rule of law." As section 52 of the Constitution makes the
Constitution, which includes the Charter, the supreme law of the land,
the Supreme Court held that a violation of any of the rights and
freedoms found in the Charter constitutes the essence of the denial
of the rule of law. Hence, access to the independent institutions to
which citizens must go to enforce these rights and freedoms is central
to the maintenance of the rule of law and, therefore, to the very
fabric of Canadian society. Access to the courts, while not mentioned
as a fundamental right and freedom in the Charter, becomes a
constitutional right, one to which other rights may have to give way.
As the Supreme Court of Canada put it:
Of what value are the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter if a person is
denied or delayed access to a court of competent jurisdiction in order to vindicate
55 BCGEU, supra, note 28 at 230.
56 (1976), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200.
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them? How can the courts independently maintain the rule of law and effectively
discharge the duties imposed by the Charter if court access is hindered, impeded or
denied? The Charter protections would become merely illusory, the entire Charter
undermined
5 7
Thus, while the picketers were exercising their constitutionally
protected right to free speech and the restraining order violated their
right, this was a justifiable denial of an otherwise guaranteed
freedom. If it were otherwise, the Supreme Court of Canada
reasoned, Canada would no longer be governed by the rule of law,
but by a rule of men and women who could determine who should
have access to the courts and, thus, to Charter rights.
It is now clear how important the characterization of the
picket line as a threatening barrier to movement was to the holding
of the courts in these cases. The lack of evidence that there was any
actual impediment was not such an obstacle to the holding in the
British Columbia case once it was decided that access to the courts
was the equivalent of an entrenched constitutional right.58 Even the
slightest interference, or possibility of interference, with access to the
courts would amount to a serious constitutional violation. Thus,
when it came to balancing the violation of the picketers'
constitutional right of free speech against the justification for the
limitation imposed upon it by the injunctions granted in these cases,
Dickson C.J. had no trouble with the problem:
57 BCGEU, supra, note 28 at 229. A skeptic who believes that the Charter, if it does
anything at all, renders surplus value to the legal profession as well as enhance its prestige,
could take comfort from this approach by the Supreme Court of Canada. Elevating the
unimpeded right of access to the courts to the status of a constitutional right fits in nicely
with the interpretations the Supreme Court of Canada has given to section 10(b) of the
Charter. While the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet clearly specified what it is that will
offend the administration of justice and bring it into such disrepute that otherwise reliable
evidence should be excluded (section 24), it has categorically stated that the denial of access
to counsel will mean that a fair trial is not possible, bringing the administration of justice into
disrepute should evidence obtained as a result of such a violation be admitted; R. v. Collins
(1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Baig (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 181 (S.C.C.). This
elevates the right to counsel above all the other legal rights found in the Charter.
58 One to which the non obstante clause might very well not apply. Note, however, that
in the Newfoundland case there were some suggestions that the legislature might reduce access
to courts by allocating less resources to the judicial system. The Court indicated that this
would not be considered objectionable by it. This brings one back to the argument that it is
who denies access to the courts which is what angered the Supreme Court of Canada rather
than whether or not access, as such, was denied; see text accompanying notes 50-52.
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It follows ... that the s. 2(b) claim falls to be decided under s. 1. Freedom of
expression protected by s. 2(b) of the Charter is obviously a highly valued right as
is the individual liberty reflected in modem democratic society by the right to strike
and the right to picket. A balance must be sought to be attained between the
individual values and the public or societal values. In the instant case, the task of
striking a balance is not difficult because without the public right to have absolute,
free and unrestricted access to the courts the individual and private right to freedom
of expression would be lost. The greater public interest must be considered when
determining the degree of protection to be accorded to individual interests.
5 9
Apparently, the question as to whether or not the proportionality
tests propounded in Oakes6° were satisfied did not present itself as
a problem to Dickson C.J. That holding was much heralded because
the proponents of the Charter were able to say that it made clear
that the courts were not going to be capricious; they would respect
democratic decisions but also be zealously watchful of Canadians'
precious rights and freedoms.
In Oakes the Supreme Court of Canada had held that section
1 imposed a stringent standard of justification upon those who
wanted to have the courts treat a violation of Charter rights and
freedoms as justified. In the absence of any analysis in the contempt
cases, it is to be presumed that the Supreme Court of Canada
thought that the potential interference with access to the courts and
the resulting restraining order was one of the circumstances in which
the answer to the questions posed by certain elements of the section
1 analysis "are obvious and self-evident" and that no further
examination was required before allowing a finding that, as far as
these elements went, the constitutional violation was justified.61 But,
that way of dealing with section 1 is only available in respect of some
of the elements of the tests propounded in Oakes. Another
requirement is that the violator of constitutional rights should make
59 Supra, note 28 at 247-48.
60 R v. Oakes (1986), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
61 One of the times that Dickson CJ. thought it to be self-evident that a curtailment
of a Charter right was warranted was in the Dairy Workers' case, supra, note 14, where he
decided that the adverse effect of the strike on innocent third parties justified the prohibition
of the strike by the legislature. In that case, however, the innocent third parties were very
closely associated with the struck employers. Wilson J., the other progressive justice on the
bench which considered this case and who, like Dickson CJ. found a right to strike to be
constitutionally entrenched, took her Chief Justice to task for his factual finding. Unlike him,
she was willing to pierce a corporate veil. This disputation tells us something about the room
for manoeuvre there always is when courts are given the task of applying largely undefined
rights to concrete situations.
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clear to the court the consequences of imposing limitations on the
constitutional right in question and demonstrate that there was no
alternative way of achieving the legislative or executive objective, one
which did not require the violation of a guaranteed constitutional
right. As outlined earlier, there was a good argument that, on the
evidence before the courts in the British Columbia case, there well
might have been sensible, alternative ways of dealing with what was,
at worst, a potential problem. But, the difficulty raised by this
argument arising out of its own careful formulation in Oakes did not
trouble the Supreme Court of Canada. Dickson C.J. did not deem
it necessary to consider the Oakes test; nor did McIntyre J. The
latter finessed the section 1 issue by holding that the picketing in
question was conduct calculated to interfere with access to the courts,
that is, with the constitutional rights of others and that, therefore, it
could not possibly attract Charter protection. Charter proponents
should take note of this when they make the argument that some of
the difficulties which critics envisage will disappear should, one fine
day, a progressive judiciary dominate the scene. To the workers who
lost, it can but matter little that their Charter right was found to exist
by a progressive judge and its abrogation was upheld by that same
progressive judge, or that a conservative judge flatly denied that they
had a constitutional right to exercise in the first place. In either case,
they were not allowed to express themselves freely.62
To return: thus far, the legal reasoning underpinning the
Supreme Court of Canada's holding that the restraining orders were
62 In the right to strike cases, supra, note 14, the argument of Dickson C.J. was that the
right to strike was constitutionally protected and that any limitations put on it by governments
were subject to judicial review. This approach should be of little comfort to workers. After
all, in those very cases, the progressive Dickson C.J. held that the government's denial of the
right to strike was justified in two of the cases before him. This cannot have looked all that
different to workers to the holding by the "conservative" wing that, in all three cases, the
government legislation was constitutionally unimpeachable. Note also that, in Dolphin Delivery,
the "progressive" and the "conservative" wings of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed that
picketing involved freedom of speech but that it was perfectly justifiable to curtail it at the
behest of a private sector applicant. The spectrum from "progressive" to "conservative" must
look very short to workers. And, finally, note that in the British Columbia contempt case,
it is McIntyre J. characterized as the "conservative" in the right to strike cases because he
rejected the claim that the guarantee of freedom to association included a constitutionally
guaranteed right to strike, who takes the Charter rights so seriously that he cannot tolerate
anyone impeding access to citizens seeking to enforce them in court, no matter what the
reason is for such interference. All of this can be rationalized legally, but from a realpolitik
perspective it is difficult to give credence to the idea that there is much of a difference
between progressive and conservative judges when class conflict issues are before them.
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easily justifiable violations of guaranteed rights and freedom is not
very persuasive when viewed through the lens of an adherent to
traditional judicial methodology. Perhaps this is why the Supreme
Court of Canada sought to bolster its argument by reference to the
Charter's preamble. This was an unusual thing to do, but it
presumably was warranted by the fact that the Charter is not to be
read as a common statute. It ought to be expected, however, that
the most superior level of the judiciary, supposedly disciplined by an
internal logic which mandates reading all texts with integrity, would
treat the preamble as a whole, or not use it at all. Now, the very
phrase which says that Canada is a country subject to the rule of law,
the key to the Court's holding, contains other words. In full, as cited
by the Court itself, the preamble reads:
Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and
the rule of law.
Now, if all the words in that phrase, including the emphasized ones,
are taken as having great and equal significance for the interpretation
of the Charter, the implications might be quite earth-shaking for the
guarantee of freedom of religion in this country. It is unlikely,
however, that the words "the supremacy of God" will ever be given
the weight the words "the rule of law" were in the contempt cases.
If this speculation has merit, once again we can point to the plastic
nature of judicial reasoning in general and to its unpersuasive nature
in the cases being examined.
There are, then, considerable difficulties with the way in
which the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the Charter argument
in contempt cases. But, these difficulties were overlooked or given
short shrift because the Court was driving towards a conclusion which
it treated as a holy grail: a sweeping proclamation that workers,
acting collectively, could not be permitted to attempt to persuade
people not to do their business in court, no matter how justified they
thought they were, or how much they believed they were exercising
their constitutionally protected rights. So much was this the case that
the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with another serious legal
problem in a single, rather off-handed, paragraph. Indeed, it referred
to it as "a preliminary matter." It was much more than that.
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In Dolphin Delivey63 the Supreme Court of Canada had held
that, while the Charter, by its own prescription applied to
governmental action, it was also applicable to the common law. But,
in that case it also was decided that when a common law rule was
invoked to deal with a dispute between litigants in the purely private
sphere, Charter protections could not be invoked. 64 The fact that it
is a state-appointed judge who applies the common law rule does not
trigger the application of the Charter. Thus, when a judge issues an
injunction in such a case at the behest of a private actor whose
interests are allegedly infringed, as was the case in Dolphin, the judge
is acting as a mere conduit pipe. The fact that the restraining order
is to be enforced with the full force of the state behind it does not
alter this characterization of the judge as a non-governmental actor.
As McIntyre J. wrote in Dolphin Delivery:
While in political science terms it is probably acceptable to treat the courts as one
of the three fundamental branches of Government, that is, legislative, executive and
judicial, I cannot equate for the purposes of Charter application the order of a court
with an element of governmental action.
6 5
Further, the fact that a successful application to this non-
governmental agent, the judge, for an injunction would result in the
abrogation of a constitutional right of the other party - workers
involved in an exercise of free speech while picketing - was not seen
as affecting the characterization of the judge's disposition as non-
governmental conduct.
In the British Columbia contempt of court case the Supreme
Court of Canada was at pains to point out that the restraining order
was not issued to protect the judge's personal dignity. If that is all
the judge had sought to do, it would have been difficult to hold that
the picketing was justifiably prohibited. There would have been no
private party on whose behalf a neutral, non-governmental judge
would have been acting, and the denial of constitutional rights -
given the lack of evidence that any disrespect was meant to that
judge - would have seemed capricious. At all levels in the British
63 Supra, note 15.
64 This leaves very little room for the application of the Charter to the common law as,
by definition, the common law deals primarily with private disputations.
65 Supra, note 15 at 600.
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Columbia case the courts were, therefore, eager to point out that the
order had not been issued to establish a perfect existence for judges,
free from the vicissitudes of every day life. Rather, the inherent
contempt powers were said to have been used to protect the public's
interest. Hence, when McEachearn C.J.S.C. rushed to his chambers
to write out his interim order without anyone having asked for it, he
was acting, in the view of the Supreme Court of Canada, in much the
same way as the intervening Attorney-General in the Newfoundland
case had, that is, as a public official. For this reason, the order's
legitimacy had to be subjected to the rigours of the Charter, unlike
the order made by the trial judge at the behest of the picketed
business in Dolphin Delivery. This acknowledgment that judicial
personality is inherently schizophrenic in that a judge may be a
governmental actor at some time, and at other times not, created a
legal problem which should have raised a question about the essence
of law. Neither the legal problem nor the inherent political question
was addressed by the Court because it dealt with the issue as a
"preliminary matter," one only raising the question as to whether or
not the Charter applied to the order of McEachern C.J.S.C. Once
the Court had characterized the conduct as a public official's act
subject to the Charter, it lost interest in the issue. It did not look for
trouble. Yet, it was there.
The legal problem was easy enough to discern. What is
special about the Charter is that it gives the judiciary a totally new
power. Until it was entrenched, courts could only review legislative
and executive action - that is; political conduct - to determine
whether or not it was within the jurisdiction of the legislature or the
executive to act as it did, and as to whether or not procedural and
fair process rules had been followed. In theory, the content of the
legislative or executive decision was not subject to judicial scrutiny.
Since the Charter, it is. This can be defended as long as the
reviewing judiciary is a politically neutral institution, unlike the
legislature or the executive. If that is the case, the court's
curtailment of political power can be justified on the basis that it is
an exercise in a rationality related to acceptable social norms, not
the crass exercise of a will by a supposedly neutral body which is
improperly competing for primacy in the political sphere with the
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explicit political arms of the state.c6 But, if the judiciary is also
entitled to engage in overt political decision-making, who is to review
its decisions? Thus, if the court's issuance of a restraining order,
which violated the constitutional rights of picketers, were a political
act - even though it was done for the common good - who could
judge whether this was acceptable political behaviour? Is a court,
alone amongst our state political institutions, not to be subjected to
the strictures of the sacrosanct Charter? Is it sufficient if another
court, albeit a superior court, reviews such governmental acts of
judges by reference to the Charter? Is there not something counter-
intuitive about the propriety of this solution to the problem? Should,
therefore, courts be subjected to legislative review in such cases?
Apart from the logistical problem this solution would create (it
smacks of the arcane renvoi doctrine in the private international law
sphere),67 was there not in the contempt cases before the Court a
factual difficulty which made this solution a troublesome one? After
all, it was known that the danger which the Supreme Court of
Canada thought had to be averted - impeding access to the courts -
no matter what the cost, had not been seen as a very serious problem
by the legislatures. They had been willing to let court workers strike.
By treating the issue as a "preliminary matter" in the way it
did, the Supreme Court of Canada avoided these interesting, and
truly difficult, legal questions. In so doing, it also ignored the deeper
implication of this line of argument.
Once the British Columbia trial judge's issuance of the
restraining order was characterized as a public act, it not only lost
66 It is this argument which, together with s. 33, is used to rebut those who say that
political power has been transferred to the judiciary, an unelected, unaccountable body. For
a more detailed discussion of the competing views of what the Charter has done to our polity,
see H. Glasbeek, "A No-Frills Look at the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or How
Politicians and Lawyers Hide Reality" [1987] Access to Justice (forthcoming; available on
request).
67 Which has not stopped some commentators from offering this kind of a way out of
the dilemma; see B. Slattery, "A Theory of the Charter" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.. 701, who
argues for a complicated co-ordinated review system and acceptance by courts and legislatures
of a very demanding kind of self-discipline. Note that the use of section 33 is a different way
of dealing with the problem, one which does not address the issue raised in the text directly.
The fact that the judges themselves have held that some of their work should not be subjected
to the Charter, even though there is no other logical way to review it, has been seen as a
flagrant abandonment of the tenets of the Charter by one of its ideologues; see D. Beatty,
"Constitutional Conceits: The Coercive Authority of the Courts," supra, note 20.
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the precarious position of a mere personal act which violated the
workers' entrenched constitutional rights, but it also became
differentiated from the judicial restraining order in Dolphin Delivery.
In Dolphin Delivery the restraining order was not held to be subject
to Charter review because it was not the result of a governmental
act. In the British Columbia contempt case, the Supreme Court of
Canada did not bother to review this analysis of the activity of a
judge when applying a common law doctrine. Yet, the question as
to why that kind of judicial act is non-governmental and the judicial
activity in the British Columbia case is a public official's act, is a very
difficult one to answer.
To be able to treat the judicial granting of the injunction in
Dolphin as a non-state act, the Supreme Court of Canada had to
view the tort of inducing breach of contract, the common law
doctrine on which the Dolphin injunction was based, as one which
had somehow come onto earth like manna from heaven, without any
help from anyone. This is a little far-fetched. The tort of inducing
breach of contract is a judicially created remedy where none existed
before the judiciary said that it should.68 Its purpose was, and is, to
protect private property and contract rights. While the tort can be
applied in many contractual and commercial situations, it has been
most significant as a weapon for employers who have used it with
telling effect against trade unions whose very purpose it is to
interfere with private property and contract rights. The doctrine was
not developed fortuitously or with ill-will. The courts adopted it
because they saw it as a justifiable means by which to perpetuate and
maintain what they perceived to be the highest public interest,
namely, the furtherance of capitalist acts between consenting adults.
In a most extreme statement of the centrality of this policy, but one
which accurately reflected the century-old dominant judicial approach,
Aylesworth J.A. wrote:
[E]ven assuming that the picketing carried on by the respondent was lawful in the
sense that it was merely peaceful picketing for the purpose only of communicating
information, I think it should be restrained. Appellant [a secondary target] had a
right lawfully to engage in its business of retailing merchandise to the public....
[W]here that business is being carried on, the picketing for the reasons already
stated has caused or is likely to cause damage to the appellant. Therefore, the right
See F.B. Sayre, "Inducing Breach of Contract" (1922-23) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 663; H.
Glasbeek, "'Lumley v. Gye' The Aftermath: An Inducement to Judicial Reform?" (1975) 1
Monash L. Rev. 187.
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if there be such a right of the respondents [union and its members] to engage in
secondaiy picketing of appellant's premises must give way to appellant's right to trade;
the former, assuming it to be a legal right is exercised for the benefit of a particular
class only while the latter is a right far more fundamental and of far greater importance,
in my view, as one which in its exercise affects and is for the benefit of the community
at large If the law is to serve its purpose then in civil matters just as in matters
within the realm of the criminal law, the interests of the community at large must
be held to transcend those of the individual or a particular group of individuals.
69
In short, in the tort of inducing breach of contract, a positive
rule had been fashioned by the courts and, if it had to be defended,
the defence would have been that it was justified as being in the
public interest. This is, of course, how both the interventions of the
Attorney-General in the Newfoundland contempt case and of
McEachern C.J.S.C. in the British Columbia case were justified. If
McEachern C.J.S.C.'s intervention was a judicial act to which the
Charter applied, then why was the judicial application of the doctrine
of inducing a breach of contract in Dolphin Delivery immune from
Charter scrutiny? The answer lies in the fact that the courts wanted
to ensure that the rights of private property and contract, exercised
by wealth owners, remain as free from fundamental challenge as they
can possibly make them. Much of the common law has been
devoted, successfully, to this objective. The primary way this goal has
been achieved is by courts rendering common law decisions which
treat existing property rights as natural phenomena, not ones which
have been politically/judicially crafted.70
69 Hersees of Woodstock Ltd v. Goldstein (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 454 (Ont. C.A.)
(emphasis added). This decision was a culmination of many which had given progressive
critics of the judiciary great concern. It caused them to say that the judiciary was unable to
deal with a contemporary society in which collective bargaining and trade unionism, as well
as strikes and picketing, were to be accorded total respect. The legislature had so indicated
and should be heeded. For a particularly trenchant comment on the Hersees case, see H.W,
Arthurs, "Picketing, Public Policy and Per Se Illegality" (1963) 41 Can. Bar. Rev. 580. It is
somewhat ironic to note that what the courts were doing (and what upset progressive people
and liberal pluralists so much) before the advent of the Charter, was inspired by the attitude
which still dominates the thinking of the Supreme Court of Canada after the Charter.
70 In Dolphin Delivery, McIntyre 3. made it clear that he understood the implications of
this argument. Having said that it was odd to say that judges were not governmental actors,
he went on to say that if it were otherwise it would 'widen the scope of Charter application
to virtually all private litigation" Supra, note 15 at 600. Such a review of the conduct of
private actors by reference to such criteria as freedom of assembly, speech, equality and
fundamental justice would bring the existing relations of production into question.
Unsurprisingly, this is not a path which a thinking Court, charged with the maintenance of the
status quo, would like to blaze.
Contempt for Workers
The courts have succeeded in convincing themselves that the
allocation of private property rights to individuals, with the economic
and political power this accords, is not the result of state action and
protection. It is assumed to have happened, somehow. The attempts
by non-propertied workers to redress the imbalance of power so
naturally created, by the use of collective activity, is seen as an
interference with the state of nature. It can, therefore, be prevented
by resort to private law fashioned by the courts to protect the natural
order. This protection of the public good requires no, or very little,
justification. It is not seen as a political act. Inasmuch as collective
activity by workers is permitted as a result of a deliberate political
alteration of the state of nature by the legislature, it may be limited
in its impact by the courts. In so doing, the courts may be able to
act positively as non-governmental actors (as in Dolphin Delivery),
positively as governmental actors (as in the British Columbia
contempt case), or passively as non-governmental actors (as in the
right to strike cases, where they assisted a reversal in legislative policy
by reference to common law doctrines developed to preserve the
state of nature; and as in the Newfoundland contempt case, where
the judge was acting as a mere technocrat applying the law as a
public official had requested). To the non-propertied people, this
must seem bleak: any way they look at it, they lose. Courts will
assist private actors to inhibit their freedom to speak and to assemble.
Courts will help governments who want to do the same. To them, it
must seem that the courts, even after the proclamation of the
Charter, from which they were told they could expect so much,
respect their political freedoms no more than they ever did.
VII. WHERE WE STAND
(i) The concerted withdrawal of labour to make both political
and economic gains is no more tolerated in Canada than it is in
Poland. We are just not as blunt about our policy. Indeed, the
British Columbia contempt case arose out of a strike which might
well have become a general strike with very serious political impact.
It was the British Columbia Government Employees' Union which
was on strike against the government and which was picketing the
court houses as part of its fight against its governmental employers.
But, in the event, it was joined by other unions and popular sector
1990]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
groups, leading to the formation of Operation Solidarity.7 Operation
Solidarity was declaiming its aspiration to change the political and
economic climate of British Columbia. Many people felt aggrieved
by what they saw as unacceptable economic restraints and a political
turning-back of the clock by the incumbent government. In this
context, the British Columbia Government Employees Union's
picketers at the court houses (and elsewhere) were seen as being
more than a bunch of isolated workers looking after themselves. The
restraining order can be justified much more easily from this
perspective. The court, as part of the state apparatus, might well
have felt the urge to stop the potential snow-balling effect of the
strike, one threatening to emulate Polish Solidarity's efforts. But, of
course, in a judicial forum it is often impossible to discuss the real
issues underlying the dispute before the court. The only reference
one finds in McEachern J.'s judgment to the drama of the events in
British Columbia is his grateful acknowledgement of the fact that the
picketers obeyed his order instantly:
The court cannot overstate how pleased it is that the good citizens of this province,
particularly the officers and members of the B.C.G.E.U., and more particularly the
regular staff of the various courts of the province, have obeyed the court's order.
In these difficult times the B.C.G.E.U. and its members have demonstrated the
incalculable value of the legal truism that everyone must obey court orders if the
rule of law is to be preserved. 7 2
If the fact that Operation Solidarity had to be thwarted had been
the basis for the decision, the lack of logical coherence would not
have been such a problem: there would have been a straightforward,
sensible and politically understandable reason for the findings by the
Supreme Court of Canada. But, the decision on this basis would also
have revealed the stark political nature of what the judiciary had
done. Hence, the argument could not be made in that way. It would
have brought into question the assumption which preserves the
legitimacy of the judiciary, namely, that it is an independent
institution. Further, it would have brought into focus something
which is conveniently ignored in most discussions about the
institutional distinctiveness of courts. This is the fact that, when push
71 The name was no coincidence.
72 Supra, note 29 at 708-09. No other reference to this issue is to be found in any of
the other judgments which dealt with the British Columbia case.
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comes to shove, the state in its guise as legislature and the state in
its guise as judiciary are not all that different. Hence, for these basic,
as well as traditional professional reasons, the argument offered by
the courts was a narrowly legal one. Ignoring the real basis for the
decision inevitably leads to incoherent reasoning. But, even if the
actual decision is sought to be justified on the basis that it made good
political, if not legal, sense, a stark fact remains. At the end of the
day, the unequivocal result of the Supreme Court of Canada's
decisions in all of the cases involving collective action by workers is
that the concerted withdrawal of labour for combined political and
economic action which is not restricted to particular employment
situations, is forbidden in Canada, just as it is in states which we find
it so easy to characterize as totalitarian.
(ii) Canadian workers may only use the right to withdraw
their labour for narrow economic purposes, that is, when their
particular employer (and some very closely integrated allies) refuse to
grant them their economic demands. Even this right is not available
to all workers. Only one-third of all Canadian workers are members
of trade unions. 73 In addition, of those people who are unionized
many have not been given strike rights. In Ontario and Alberta,
74
the public servants may not use this right at all and all governments
reserve the right to designate some employees as "essential," thereby
denying them the right to strike.75
(iii) Not only are relatively few people entitled to strike, they
may only do so in limited circumstances - after negotiations,
conciliation, and waiting periods, and not during the life of a
collective agreement. Moreover, legislatures can remove even these
73 Corporations and Labour Union Reporting Act, Annual Report for 1985 (Ottawa:
Statistics Canada, 1985). But, note that as trade unions are collective bargaining agents for
non-union members of the bargaining unit they represent, the number of people who
participate in collective bargaining may be as high as 50 percent of the workforce. But, as
the following text shows, this does not mean that 50 percent of Canada's workforce has been
granted the right to strike.
74 See, for example, The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.108;
The Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 205.
75 As was the case, for example, in the circumstances which gave rise to the
Newfoundland case, supra, note 51.
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embryonic strike rights. They do so increasingly often.76 They have
been helped by the courts. As the right to strike cases show, the
courts are supportive of such curtailments, even after the enactment
of the Charter.
(iv) Collective attempts to persuade people not to do business
with someone other than the primary target of a lawful strike are
also forbidden, even if the persuasive tactics used are not.
intimidatory, are not accompanied by violence, nor by any other
unlawful act. The courts fashioned means to prevent the dislocation
of secondary results of worker militance a long time ago. They
provided remedies at the behest of private economic actors. They
have shown that the Charter will not stand in the way of their efforts
to protect private property owners from the effects of secondary
picketing.
(v) When unions attempt to win support for lawful strike
action by appealing to the public by means of mass picketing, their
members' rights of free speech and assembly may be subjugated to
some other form of public interest, not identified as directly with a
particular business' right to trade. This is what happened in the
contempt cases. The courts proved themselves willing, perhaps even
eager, to justify the violation of the workers' right to speak freely
about issues of vital concern to them on the basis of some rather ill-
defined notion of public interest.
(vi) In the upshot, workers, qua workers, are only allowed to
picket (that is, to exercise their freedom of speech as a collective) for
narrow economic purposes. Thus, given the circumstances of their
lack of access to means of public communication, the most efficient
means by which to exercise their right to free speech is seriously
limited. Indeed, their claim to be allowed to exercise their political
rights in the most effective way possible is strongest when they are
seeking to use that political right for aims which are the least likely
to affect the political processes and institutions in Canada. That is,
they are most free to picket and communicate as organized workers
76 L'Panitch & D. Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Consent to
Coercion Revisited (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988) have shown that, in the last ten years,
every government in Canada has passed laws restricting the right to strike of some of their
workers. In addition, they have collected data which show that the number of times that
people who are lawfully on strike have had that right taken away from them in mid-strike by
ad-hoc back-to-work legislation, has also increased dramatically.
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when their target is one employer and their objective is a few cents
per hour. A paradox has been created.
It took close to two hundred years for workers to obtain a
measure of legitimacy for trade unionism and for collective bargaining
with an associated right to strike. To get this far, they withheld their
labour in concert and sought influence in legislatures. Indeed, they
used economic weapons to get the franchise enlarged to help them
get more economic and political rights.77 They were jailed, deported,
and killed. Unquestionably, they helped obtain such rights as they
(and all of us) have today by engaging in political action in the
broadest sense of that term. Now, collective rights are under attack
by people who are able to use the Charter to assert their
individualistic political rights. Unions and their members must prove
that their hard-fought-for measure of collective power is only used
for narrow economic purposes if they are to be allowed to retain it.
It is this which underlies decisions like Lavigne78 where the union's
right to levy dues from its members was limited to those dues which,
in the court's opinion, were directly enough connected to economic
collective bargaining activities. This serves to remind the
memberships that their unions are not meant to be agents for the
enrichment of their political participation in Canadian society. Again,
the recent attack on the closed shop by an employer who wanted to
employ her grandson, despite a statutorily permitted agreement with
the union which sought to prohibit the hiring of non-union labour,
was made under the aegis of the employer's claim to the rights and
freedoms which she asserted the Charter had bestowed on her. In
particular, her claim was that her right to contract and to associate
77 See G.S. Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History 1832-
1982 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) c. 3; Hobsbawm, "Labour and Human
Rights" in Hobsbawm, Worlds of Labour (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984) has argued
that "by far the most powerful mobilizations of labour on the continent, e.g., general strikes,
were for electoral reforms, as in Belgium and Sweden." He argues that it is not until near
the end of the century that labour begins to give economic matters priority when it uses its
strike power and that this happens first in Britain. That is, there is a long history of labour
militance to achieve greater political freedom.
7 8 Re Lavigne and Ontario Public Service Employees Union (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 321;
the ruling was applied to the facts in Re Lavigne and Ontario Public Service Employess Union
(No. 2) (1987), 41 D.L.R. (4th) 86. The trial judgment in favour of Lavigne was reversed on
the basis that union due raising and use was not subject to the Charter, see Re Lavigne and
Ontario Public Service Employees Union: CLC interveners (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 474 (Ont.
CA).
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freely had been abrogated by the closed shop agreement into which
she had entered with the union. The court rejected the employer's
claim. But, central to this decision was the argument that collective
bargaining - which affects the quality of life of workers more than
almost anything else - was a purely private commercial kind of
transaction, one to which the Charter did not apply.79  These
decisions affirm that unions are only legitimate insofar as they
facilitate the buying and selling of labour power. This is not what
the historic struggles launched by workers and the unions were all
about. To the contrary: they assign a role to Canadian trade unions
of the very kind which the totalitarian Polish leadership wanted to
assign to its militant workers when they organized themselves into a
political union.
(vii) The courts have played a leading role in these
developments. The Charter has handed anti-union forces arguments
which they did not have before.80  The courts have proved
themselves only too willing to provide these people with a forum in
which to make the arguments. The composition of the benches,
whether dominantly "progressive" or "conservative," has had but little
impact: even members of the acknowledgedly more progressive wings
of the courts find it natural to restrict collective activity by workers,
especially if such activity is perceived as likely to have a political
impact (as contrasted with an economic one, in the sense of a wage
increase or a new monetary benefit).
(viii) Participation in respect of planning and investment, the
introduction of technology, the decision to implement mass lay-offs,
(contrast individual dismissals), is minimal for the minority of
Canadian workers who have collective bargaining rights with the right
7 9 Re Arlington Crane Service Limited and Ontario Minister of Labour (1988), 56 D.L.R.
(4th) 209 (Ont. Sup. Ct).
80 It is inconceivable that any Canadian politician, no matter how antediluvian, would
have sought to attack the right of a union to raise political dues, or its right to a closed shop
arrangement. After all, every province in Canada provides for the automatic dues check-off
and some measure of preferential treatment for union workers. The legitimacy of the
automatic dues check-off has been accepted in Canada since 1946 when Rand, a Supreme
Court of Canada judge to-be, recommended its acceptance; see Justice I.C. Rand, "Rand
Formula" Canadian Law Reports 2150 (1958) at 1251-53.
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to strike attached.81 It is virtually non-existent amongst the
unorganized workers who constitute over half the work population.
The right of participation in such matters is much better developed
in Europe, including countries in the eastern block8 2 That is, in the
workplace sphere it is difficult to portray Canadian workers as having
won much by way of democratic rights, although the theory of
collective bargaining is that they may demand as much control as
they would like. But, reality and theory are far apart.
(ix) Canadian workers do have electoral political rights, qua
citizens, which are much more beneficial than those found in one-
party states. But it is to be remembered that Canadian workers
participate as individuals, equipped solely with their talents and
resources. This kind of fragmentation makes it very difficult for them
to exercise much influence. Certainly this kind of political
participation makes them much less effective than they could be if
they were allowed to use their power to withhold their productive
power in concert in order to achieve their political aims. History,
even recent history such as that in British Columbia and Quebec,
shows that workers often want to do just that. In this sense, their
political participatory rights are much more attenuated than they
might have been. Inasmuch as it is argued that it is not true that
Canadian working class people are at a disadvantage because, de jure,
their participatory rights are the same as those of their natural
political opponents - persons of wealth - it is obvious that, de facto,
those opponents have additional means to influence political decision-
makers.8 3 Not only do they have more means to help them express
81 For instance, in 1985, 85 percent of collective agreeements covering more than five
hundred employees did not even have provisions which required labour-management
committees to monitor - let alone control - the introduction of new technology; see Labour
Canada, Provisions in Major Collective Agreements in Canada covering more than 500 Employees
(Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1985). In respect of mass lay-offs, employers are required to abide
by notice and seniority provisions. For some jurisdictions, e.g., Ontario and Manitoba, they
may have to pay additional severence payments. But, workers do not participate in the
decision, nor can they prevent it.
82 See G. Hunnius, D. Garson & J. Case eds, Workers' Control (New York: Vintage
Books, 1973).
83 In 1904, John Maynard Keynes noted that one of the roadblocks to democracy was
that "whatever be the numerical representation of wealth, its power will always be out of
proportion." As quoted in R. Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan, 1983)
at 156.
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themselves, to have their views heard and propagated, but they can
also withdraw, or threaten to withdraw, their productive power, that
is, their capital. They can do so because, should they act in this way,
they would be acting, as individuals, in their own best interest. Self-
enlightened conduct by exploiting one's individual abilities and
resources is the very essence of liberal freedom, whereas self-
enlightened conduct by a collectivity of individuals, whose individual
self-maximizing activities would have no telling impact on their
antagonists, is offensive to pure liberal ideology. While, over time,
there has been some mediation of this pristine model, permitting
some economic collective action by workers, the basic premises have
not changed. It is they which underly the judicial decision-making
discussed in this paper.
Moreover, the propertied classes' withdrawal, or threats of
withdrawal, of their capital are even more influential when they are
made by corporations, that is, collectivities, rather than by individuals.
This is true because politically, they are perceived as eunuchs without
an axe to grind and because economically, they constitute the largest
accumulations of wealth in the country. Corporations, which are
aggregates of many small capitals and which often refer to themselves
as being made up of many individual co-producers, have been treated
as individuals by the law. The courts were instrumental in this useful
legal development long before the advent of the Charter. Since the
enshrinement of the Charter in the Constitution, however, the courts
have taken the personification, the individualization of corporations
- which improves the wealthy classes' political powers enormously -
to bizarre extremes. The case of Southam84 which entitled the
corporation to privacy, just like any human being, and Big M85 -
which held that a corporation may have a religious belief, just like
any human being - illustrate this all too well. This personification,
together with the courts' anti-collectivist bias, led Petter to note that:
Corporations are private persons that may invoke Charter rights beyond those
enjoyed by their individual shareholders (Hunter v. Southam Inc., supra), including
rights (such as freedom of religion) that have no direct relevance to economic
entities: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
84 Supra, note 8.
85 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
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Trade unions are statutory entities that may not invoke Charter rights beyond those
enjoyed by their individual members, not even rights (such as the right to bargain
collectively and to strike) that are central to union activities: Reference Re Public
Service Employee Relations Act.
Charter rights to freedom of religion, expression and association and to privacy serve
as proxies for protecting economic activities such as store openings [R. v. Big M.
Drug Mart Ltd, supra], commercial advertising [Irwin Toy Ltd v.A G. Quebec, D.LR.
(4th) 641, (C.A.)(leave to appeal to the S.C.C. granted) Re Grier and Alberta
Optometric Association (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 327, 53 Alta L.R. (2d) 289 (C.A.)],
the formation of business partnerships [Black v. Law Society of Alberta, 27 D.L.R.
(4th) 527, (sub nom. Black & Company v. Law Society of Alberta)(C.A.)] and the
protection of corporate records from government scrutiny [Hunter v. Southan Ina,
supra].
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To sum up, the right of the corporations, which are in fact
collectives but which are legally treated as individuals, to participate
politically by the manipulative use of their economic power is
enhanced, at the same time as the courts have cut down the workers'
rights to use their economic power to make political gains.
(x) The Charter, on its face, embodies a vision of political
freedoms to which most people can subscribe. But, what is
frequently forgotten is that the Charter is to be implemented in a
society where the treatment of all individuals as equals is a gross
distortion of reality. Moreover, the Charter is to be given life by an
institution with a historic mission. It is the judiciary's responsibility
to protect private property and contract rights. The courts are not
concerned with gross inequality in wealth. They assume this to have
been "neutrally or naturally" developed. They do not, therefore,
focus on the huge disparities in the quality of life and in the gaps in
opportunities to participate in political processes which these "neutral
and natural" inequalities create. Thus when, armed with the Charter,
those who have property have come to the court to attack the rather
embryonic rights of the workers as a class, they have won. The
courts have treated these powerful people (often appearing in court
as large corporations) as individuals confronted by a brutish collective
force (such as a union) who are potential oppressors of brave
minorities and lonely individuals.
86 A. Petter, "Legitimizing Sexual Inequality. Three Early Charter Cases" (1989) 34
McGill Li. 358 at 359, note 3.
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The jurisprudence which the Canadian courts have produced
when confronted by class issues since the advent of the Charter
should be a lesson to those who want a more equal, more democratic
society. An institution which is democratically unaccountable and
whose relative autonomy depends on being seen to be above the
fray, is not likely to be responsive to demands for a radically different
view of society. The cases which have been discussed clearly
demonstrate that rational argument will not convince the courts to
read the Charter as requiring a radical revision of political and
economic relationships. Of all the institutions we have, the judiciary
is the least likely, especially when armed with a classically liberal
document such as the Charter, to recognize that the real source of
inequality and oppression in our society is private power which results
in increased political power for those with economic wherewithal.
The courts will make it harder, rather than easier, to get state
institutions to act on behalf of the working classes and at the expense
of the employing classes. Increasingly this makes the state "the"
enemy as it moves front and centre in the advancement of the rich
at the expense of the poor. Paradoxically, this buttresses the
argument of those who claim that electoral and other direct forms of
politics are not useful and that the courts must be looked to for
progress.87  This is dangerous. The courts are not hospitable to
arguments which require a recognition that inequality is systemic to
our political economy.
87 It is this which caused my colleague Michael Mandel and I to talk about the
legalization of politics; see "'The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies 84, and also M. Mandel,
The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson,
1989).
[VOL. 28 NO. 1
